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REVIEWS
Cynthia L. Allen, Case marking and reanalysis : grammatical relations from
Old to early Modern English. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. xviii­509.
Reviewed by Ans van Kemenade, HIL}Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
This book presents extensive and careful documentation of the history of
those English constructions featuring the notorious impersonal verbs and
passives." The account is embedded in a discussion of the Old English (OE)
system of case and its subsequent breakdown; the analysis relies on Lexical
Mapping theory, in which the mapping between thematic role, grammatical
function and case is central.
In the introduction, the aims of the book are laid out: a reexamination,
based on newly collected facts, of the evidence for the hypothesis that the
changes in constructions featuring impersonals and passives are due to the
loss of the morphological case system.
Chapter 2 contains an overview of those parts of OE syntax most relevant
to the book: case marking with particular verb classes, agreement,
constituent order, formal subjects, and coordinate subject deletion. The
latter may not immediately seem central, but since it is the only workable test
for establishing the grammatical function SUBJECT relevant later in the
book, it is of crucial importance to the author.
Chapter 3 is about case marking and the experiencer (EXP) verbs in OE.
EXP verbs usually have two arguments, with the roles of EXP and Theme.
These can be realized as two NPs, and here again there are three subtypes:
both NPs can appear with a nonnominative case (mainly DAT for the EXP,
GEN for the Theme, and the finite verb in default 3sg). In the two alternative
types, either the EXP or the Theme can be nominative, and if so it agrees with
the finite verb: Allen’s evidence for assuming otherwise when the nominative
is postverbal is very slender. A different way of realizing the two arguments
is as NP and clause, where the EXP is sometimes nominative, but mostly
dative. The clause sometimes appears in construction with hit ‘ it ’ or the
demonstrative pronoun æt ‘ that ’.
In chapter 4 on the syntax of the EXP verbs in OE, an analysis is presented
in terms of Lexical Mapping Theory (Bresnan & Kanerva 1989). The
primary aim is to establish that EXPs, when preverbal, have the grammatical
[1] Thanks to Nigel Vincent for discussion of LFG and related matters. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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role SUBJECT, though their case is overwhelmingly dative. Assuming
without discussion that SVO is the common word order, Allen argues that
dative EXPs occur preverbally considerably more often than unequivocal
objects, which putatively shows that they are subjects. Real evidence for the
SUBJECT status of the preposed dative EXP, notwithstanding the rarity of
the examples, comes from coordinate subject deletion. Having established in
chapter 2 that coordinate subject deletion in the vast majority of cases takes
place under coreference with a nominative subject, and rarely with an object,
Allen shows that EXPs in the various impersonal constructions, when
‘preverbal ’, control coordinate subject deletion in about 50% of the cases.
In view of the fact that objects can be ‘preverbal ’, I would, however, prefer
to restrict the conclusion to observing that this shows that the EXP is the
subject in 50% of the cases. Rejecting, convincingly, the hypothesis of Elmer
(1981) that hit subjects are inserted to satisfy the verb second target#,
Allen further argues that the systematic absence of the formal subject hit
in constructions with preposed EXPs is accounted for by the assumption that
the EXP is the subject. This latter claim remains to be supported: the absence
of hit or ær is not unusual in all unaccusative constructions, with or without
EXP, except those with weather verbs, contra Allen’s implication (118) that
empty subjects are virtually restricted to coordinate subject deletion contexts.
Chapter 4 further gives an account of the mapping between semantic role,
grammatical function, and case, accommodating in detail a variety of
idiosyncrasies. The preposed dative EXP has the grammatical role
SUBJECT. One phenomenon stands out in this section: while in double-NP
constructions with a nominative Theme, the EXP is in Allen’s terms often
mapped as the SUBJECT, this is never true when both arguments are
pronouns (143). An account for this is suggested in terms of the ‘ importance’
of the Theme in the discourse, appealing to the fact that the pronominal
Theme can usually precede a nominal EXP as well. This account is rather
vague and implies that discourse considerations take precedence over
grammatical function assignment. The constraint that an object pronoun can
precede a nominal but not a pronominal nominative subject is a pretty strong
one in OE, and it seems to me that one should surely want to try and account
for it as a feature of grammar rather than discourse.
In chapter 5, on the loss of case marking, Allen documents in detail the loss
of morphological case distinctions in the various dialects of Middle English.
In regular transitive contexts, the distinction between various kinds of object
case ceased to be signalled by morphological means by the middle of the
thirteenth century, resulting in the loss of lexically determined case. The
remaining domain for lexical case was impersonal contexts with a preposed
dative EXP when the EXP is a pronoun with object case. This putatively
[2] It should be noted, however, that this is a separate matter from that of the relevance of V2,
or the hypothesis that the first constituent meets an animacy target.
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argues against accounts which rely centrally on the loss of the case system to
explain the demise of the impersonal constructions.
Chapter 6 is on the development of EXP verbs. Preposed dative EXPs
continued to have the function SUBJECT until well after the demise of the
morphological case system. Stressing the amount of lexical variation, Allen
shows that the loss of the constructions was a gradual one, completed only
by the end of the fifteenth century. Parameter resettings as proposed in the
literature cannot, according to Allen, account for the loss.
Chapter 7 is devoted to explaining the loss of the preposed dative EXP.
Following up on the arguments of the previous two chapters, Allen views the
disappearance of the preposed dative EXP as the result of a gradual
disfavouring of the option of case-marking subjects lexically. The pressure
towards structural case-marking for subjects, compounded by the loss of case
distinctions, gradually led to a situation where preposed dative EXPs were so
infrequently used that there was insufficient evidence for the language learner
to incorporate them in the grammar. The question of how such a general
disfavouring is determined lexically, remains undiscussed.
Chapter 8 is on changes in passives of verbs which in OE had one dative
object. Direct passivization of such verbs became the norm as early as the
thirteenth century. Allen’s account for this is that already in OE, such verbs
had as object an NP with the thematic role Theme, which was assigned dative
case. This is supported by the fact that the OE dative NP was replaced by a
bare NP rather than a PP. Once the object case-marking distinctions were
lost, this Theme was interpreted as a direct object with structural case, and
was accordingly passivized.
In Chapter 9, on changes in passives of verbs with two object-like
arguments, Allen attempts to establish that dative-fronted passives of
ditransitives were lost by the middle of the fourteenth century, and argues
that direct passivization of this object was not convincingly found before the
last quarter of the fourteenth century. Allen concludes that dative-fronted
passives were lost as a spin-off of a more general loss of fronted datives (there
was never evidence that fronted recipients were SUBJECTs). Recipient
passives did not develop out of dative-fronted passives, but resulted from the
fixing of double object order, completed by the last quarter of the fourteenth
century. The first NP following the verb (the earlier dative) was reinterpreted
as the direct object.
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter, giving a summary of the changes and
discussing some of the implications for extant views of language change.
The book contains three appendices : the first contains a discussion of early
examples of recipient passives (rejecting them as invalid) ; the second gives
details of the data investigations ; the third gives an overview of the texts
cited.
It is impossible to review all aspects of the book. It is rich in historical
detail, and there are inevitably many points to discuss and}or disagree with.
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This is, however, beyond the scope of this evaluation. I will therefore restrict
myself to two interrelated points on which I would like to counterbalance
Allen’s position. This will touch on points of history, as well as theory and
interpretation of data.
Allen’s assumptions on constituent order, laid out in chapter 2, regrettably
preclude an attractive integration of her results with the current debate on
OE and ME word order. Allen rejects previous analyses of OE constituent
order in terms of the verb second (V2) constraint, basically because they are
not perfect, and goes on to ignore the positive insights emerging from them,
including the well-established fact that there are rather systematic differences
between the position of the finite and nonfinite verb. Her resulting positional
distinction is between ‘preverbal ’ and ‘postverbal ’, while even casual
inspection of the extensive literature should show that in a main clause with
a lexical finite verb, the term ‘preverbal ’ may refer to at least three
distributionally distinguishable positions : the first position; the inverted
position; a ‘ low’ position, often sentence-final, in unaccusative constructions,
including impersonals. Since a substantial part of the book is devoted to
showing that dative EXPs, when ‘preverbal ’, are in many cases subjects, it
would seem more to the point to establish in detail what the possible
positions for subjects with agent verbs generally are in OE. Similarly, in the
discussion of object fronting, the relative position of subject and object is
discussed without any reference to the verb. Since nominative subjects can be
found sentence-finally in several kinds of contexts in OE, and objects are
found easily in the first position of the main clause, and routinely in a
position preceding the nonfinite verb, this simply does not tell us enough
about the ‘fronting’ of objects.
The V2 issue reemerges in chapter 4 : first rejecting the hypothesis
presented in Elmer (1981) that preposed dative EXPs meet a V2 target, Allen
states : ‘All other things being equal, we would expect the nominal object of
a main clause to be postverbal ; preverbal nominal objects were possible in
main clauses but normally unusual, and there is no reason why they should
be so frequent in the type N construction [the construction with two
nonnominative arguments–(AvK)] ’ (106). The relevance of this categorical
statement is restricted to main clauses with one finite transitive lexical verb
with a nominative subject. The object is probably postverbal in such cases
because the finite verb satisfies a version of the V2 constraint, so that it
precedes the object, and as a result of the relevance of V2, OVS orders are
not unusual either. OE verb position can be properly recognized only when
both the finite and nonfinite verbs are considered, and inspection of those
patterns reveals that objects can occupy an array of positions, including a
‘preverbal ’ one. Given the fact that nonnominative constituents can appear
preverbally in general, it should come as no surprise that they do so more
often in constructions without a nominative subject, and Elmer’s (1981)
animacy target, criticized somewhat ungenerously, does not seem to fare so
230
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badly here, especially in view of Allen’s own facts about animateness. The
same applies to the construction where the EXP is dative and the Theme
nominative, or a clause: since the grammar allows the preposed dative EXP
to appear clause-initially, it does so with considerable frequency as the only
nonclausal argument in the sentence. It is probably correct to say that
preposed dative EXP’s did not meet a V2 target, pace Elmer (1981), but it
does not follow that V2 is irrelevant. A V2 approach that explicitly
accommodates unaccusative constructions can be found in van Kemenade
(1992) ; Hulk & van Kemenade (1993). This also accounts for the fact that
preposed dative EXPs became extinct, apart from some fixed expressions, by
the end of the fifteenth century: the time when the loss of V2 with topics was
completed. Allen’s approach and one in terms of V2 would seem to
complement each other very nicely : Allen makes a clear case that often,
preposed dative EXPs are subjects and that a good deal of the synchronic
and diachronic variation is lexical ; on the other hand, a V2 account makes
it clear why nonnominatives may appear initially at all, and meshes well with
Allen’s approach. I believe then, that Allen’s account of the history of
impersonals, while convincing for their lexical properties, errs on the
nonstructural side. I will now turn to a point where she seems to me to err
on the structural side.
In chapter 9, Allen is at pains to establish that there is only a tenuous
historical connection between the loss of the dative-fronted passive and the
rise of the recipient passive. Rather, recipient passives begin to be found
when double object order was fixed. The resulting view of this instance is a
radical reanalysis, one that Allen professes not to subscribe to in general, and
which was made around 1375. This case is made acceptable, however, by the
fact that the evidence for the old construction was completely gone before the
reanalysis was made. The chapter is rather puzzling. Having been impressed
throughout the book by the care with which Allen attempts to accommodate
every last example, I was surprised that her date for the loss of the dative-
fronted passive is about 1350, whereas she records poetic examples until a
century later. And in the discussion of the rise of the recipient passive, early
examples which are ambiguous between a dative-fronted passive and a
recipient passive are interpreted as dative-fronted (390, ex. (249–250)), as if
ambiguity by definition points to the older analysis. Similarly, Allen observes
that there is some evidence from beyond the date of the putative reanalysis
that double object order was not entirely fixed. It is quite unclear to me why
the data would force us to interpret this reanalysis as being this abrupt, unless
it is because Allen doesn’t want the fronted datives to be reanalysed as
nominative because there is no evidence that they had the SUBJECT
grammatical role. On the basis of the facts presented, it would seem more
plausible to say that the fronted dative at that point in history could be
reinterpreted as nominative on the strength of its position, although it was
not the SUBJECT; that this interpretation was reinforced by the fixing of
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double object order, as according to Allen; and that dative-fronted passives
were lost in the second half of the fifteenth century, when the loss of V2 was
coming to completion.
In conclusion, I recommend this book for its detailed, careful and explicit
historical account, even though it follows from the above that I think Allen
could have reached further by being less dismissive of current approaches to
English historical syntax, in particular to clause structure.
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Denis Bouchard, The semantics of syntax: a Minimalist approach to grammar.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. xiii­525.
Reviewed by Danie' le Godard, Universite! Paris 7
The semantics of syntax purports to defend and illustrate a restricted view of
semantics, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. It contains two
chapters dealing with general matters, and three chapters applying the
proposed approach to specific problems: Verbs of movement in French,
Psych verbs, and Functional projections in S.
The author partitions semantics into three layers. Contrasting what he
calls ‘situational semantics ’, which deals with background knowledge and
pertains to general cognitive capacities rather than linguistics, with ‘ linguistic
semantics ’, solely concerned with linguistically relevant aspects of meaning,
he further selects as his object that part of the latter which affects syntactic
form, or ‘G-semantics ’ (for Grammar semantics). From this perspective,
existing semantic approaches (the mentalist conception of Jackendoff 1983,
1990, which the author seems to have particularly in mind, as well as truth-
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conditional and all denotational approaches) do not qualify as G-semantics
or even linguistic semantics, because they all use extra-linguistic notions,
such as theta-roles, which have to do with the way human experience is
organized, and which, the author claims, have no effect on grammar. What
makes this point of view interesting is the author’s determination to ground
it empirically. He concentrates on two problems, with detailed analyses of
French data: the mapping between grammatical function and interpretation
for the arguments of psychological verbs, and the polysemy of movement
verbs.
As is well-known, the co-existence of the two classes of psych verbs (fear
vs frighten), where experiencer and trigger seem to exchange their position
(Maria fears storms} storms frighten Maria), prevents a straightforward and
systematic alignment of theta-roles and grammatical functions. Carefully
examining the answers which have been given to the problem, the author
points out that they all have to resort to linking between function and theta-
role for each verb class, which, in his view, amounts to simply listing the
possibilities. Moreover, he shows the arguments given in favor of the
relevance of theta-roles in grammatical processes to be unconvincing. Thus,
he concludes that classifications of verbs based on theta-roles are
misconceived. Similarly, the polysemy of so-called movement verbs is
problematic if the hypothesis that movement is the basic meaning is
maintained, because it leads to an enumeration of the different uses,
obscuring what they have in common. The difficulty disappears if the domain
of space is not given priority : although such priority may be justified when
one considers conceptualization, it is not so from a linguistic point of view.
Abstracting away from extra-linguistic considerations, one has a better
chance to get at the central meaning of polysemous entities.
The proposal can be summarized as follows. Predicates are associated with
an abstract semantic representation, based on lexical decomposition and
formalized as a tree structure. Syntactic structures are also represented as
trees. Since one-to-one correspondence is untenable (given lexical de-
composition), the mapping is a homomorphism, preserving dominance
relations. It is further constrained by the Full Identification Principle, which
says that ‘every syntactic formative must have a corresponding element in
the semantic representation’, and ‘every formative of the semantic
representation must be identified by a morphosyntactic element in the
sentence with which that representation is associated’ (93). Although Full
Identification countenances a meaningful functional category such as Tense,
which expresses the anchor on the moment of speech, it precludes the use of
AGR, because this functional category fails to correspond to an element of
the semantic representation. Accordingly, the author explains in the last
chapter why there is in effect no advantage in positing AGR, discussing most
notably French data on adverbs and more specifically negation, which
motivated positing AGR in the first place.
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The tree representation is at the center of the proposal. It must be
emphasized that it is not here purely a formal tool, but is associated with a
meaning: two nodes can be sisters or mother and daughter only if a certain
relation holds between them; the semantic tree is seen as providing an
‘orientation’ relation between nodes (roughly, a higher node is ‘oriented’
towards a lower and c-commanded one, 64–66). A simple example of the
semantic-syntactic interface is given by the analysis of verbs like melt which
have a transitive (causative) and an intransitive (inchoative) use:
(1) (a) John melted the ice
(b) The ice melted
The semantic representation of melt is given in (2).
(2) A
Bx
CAUSE C
MELTy
In (1a), the two variables are identified with the arguments John and the ice,
and the nodes B and C of the semantic representation (which are left
unspecified) are ‘chunked’ into one syntactic node, their respective heads
being themselves chunked into the V melt. The same semantic tree is
associated with (1b), with the higher variable identified with the NP the ice
and the lower variable co-indexed with, and bound by, the higher one. The
analysis is empirically supported by data showing that the subjects of
inchoative verbs have properties of the entity that brings about the event as
well as properties of the entity that undergoes the change.
A more complex illustration is offered by movement verbs. The author
studies six French movement verbs in detail, in order to show that, in each
case, it is possible to reduce their diverse uses to one common abstract core.
For example, nine uses are associated with venir (‘ to come’) : movement
(Max vient de Paris ‘Max is-coming from Paris ’), progredience (Max vient
deU jeuner ‘Max is-coming to-lunch’), origin (Ce mot vient du latin ‘That word
comes from Latin’), extension (Cette route vient de MontreUal ‘That road
comes from Montreal ’), time (Max vient de partir ‘Max has just left ’), end-
reaching (Si le directeur venait a[ mourir ‘ If the director came to die ’),
involvement (Ne venez pas me dire que Jean est malade ! ‘Don’t come and tell
me that Jean is sick! ’), availability (Cette robe vient en trois tailles ‘That dress
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comes in three sizes ’), and measure (Marie lui vient a[ l’eUpaule ‘Marie comes
to his shoulder’). The common core is given in (3) (121).
(3) A˝
A´x1
x2 o
The element ‘o’ stands for the deictic center (ME-HERE-NOW); it follows
from the properties of the tree, that x2 is in some relation with o, that A«
and A§ are projections of o, and that x1 is oriented towards x2 and towards
o. In a sentence, x1 is identified with the subject, so that venir indicates that
the subject is in relation with the deictic center o. The different uses are
deduced from the properties of the argument or adjunct phrases, in
conjunction with background knowledge. In the first use, the P de is
associated with a source interpretation, and both the subject of the V and the
complement of de denote spatial entities ; typical properties attributed to
actants as spatial entities will tell us that the orientation in this case means
movement.
In spite of its many merits to which we return below, it is not likely that
this book will convince semanticists in general that they should limit their
work in the way proposed here, either in the definition of their task, or in
choice of tree representation. Semantics is an attempt at modeling the way in
which languages (or speakers) talk about the world. It is not clear what might
be gained in defining a sub-part of the field (G-semantics) from which certain
notions are expelled because they involve a representation of the world: such
notions will come back in any explicit account of the interpretation, in
accounting for the difference between acceptable and non-acceptable
sentences and discourses, and in representing lexical meaning. The two case
studies offered do not convincingly make the point. It is an important debate
whether polysemous lexical items have a core meaning, but, even if a very
abstract core like that proposed above for venir can be constructed, it is
impossible to deduce the different ‘uses ’ without appealing to ‘real-world
notions’. To get the second meaning of venir, for instance, the author appeals
to animacy for the subject and the distinction between stage-level and
individual-level predicates for the infinitival. Similarly, the discussion of
psych verbs shows that the notions of experiencer and trigger are much too
crude and probably misleading, and that distinctions based on the notion of
point of view are relevant, not that any appeal to world-related notions
should be banned.
As explained above, the semantic tree is said to incorporate an
‘orientation’. Although the idea may seem strange at first, it is rightly
emphasized (64 ff.) that the formalizations used by linguists are not devoid
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of meaning. In itself, the tree only represents groupings, and is associated
with a different meaning in each field (genealogy, decision trees etc.).
Linguists would agree that the syntactic tree is associated with constituency
(Miller 1993). The author’s idea, then, is that a different meaning
(‘orientation’) should be associated with the lexical semantic tree. We are
told that ‘orientation’ means the same thing as it does in real world
situations, and that the determining factors differ from one conceptual
domain to another. This is not as clear as one would like. In fact, the notion
is not clearly distinguished from movement, but rather appears to be
something like a disposition towards movement. If so, it is possible that we
do not escape from a metaphorical vision of trees here, and it remains to be
seen what it would do outside the domain of movement verbs (the notion is
not an important ingredient in the analysis of psych verbs).
Nevertheless, this book has much to commend it. It is written in a
purposeful way. The bibliographical coverage is impressive ; in particular, it
is not restricted to American publications, as is too often the case, but
includes discussions of analyses or hypotheses proposed by French and
Canadian linguists. While the aim of the book is very general, the properties
of the constructions that are given as examples are taken very seriously,
scrutinized and discussed in detail, because of the unfailing determination of
the author to ground his position in a precise examination of the data." Thus,
the book is of interest to linguists of all persuasions. It is full of interesting
observations and discussions. The chapter on psych constructions is
particularly enjoyable, taking the reader through a critical assessment of all
the properties that can be found in the literature, and enlarging the
discussion from psych verbs to psych constructions, with non-psych verbs
having a psych use. Thus, this chapter is particularly useful for anybody
interested in a thorough description of a semantic class of verbs, and in the
discussion of the use of theta-roles, and the relation between syntactic and
(lexical) semantic properties in general.
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[1] The only place where the reviewer disagrees with the acceptability judgements concerns the
distribution of French adverbs in chapter 5. It would be interesting to know whether the
proposed judgements have to do with the bilingual situation in Quebec.
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Michael Brody, Lexico-logical form: a radically Minimalist theory. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Pp. vii­155.
Reviewed by Anna Roussou, University of Wales, Bangor
In this monograph Brody argues for a non-derivational model of grammar
which takes the relationship between sound and meaning to be direct,
without any need for mediating levels of representation, such as S- and D-
structure. LF then is the only syntactic level to which the lexicon has direct
access ; this is the lexico-logical form (LLF). Move a is captured under the
notion of chains. In the absence of movement operations lexical items must
occur in their PF position at LF. Thus LF-properties are recovered from PF,
a conclusion which is most desirable from a learnability point of view as well.
Contentive elements can be spelled out in different positions within a chain,
depending on the morphological properties of a given language.
The overall goal of the monograph is definitely achieved: a number of
redundancies characteristic of the GB framework as well as of Chomsky’s
(1993, 1995) Minimalism are eliminated, giving rise to a more elegant picture
of grammar. The approach is original and the discussion thorough. The
argumentation is clear and long-standing problems (e.g. Subjacency, parasitic
gaps, etc.) are successfully analysed from a new perspective.
Brody’s main argument is that a grammar that incorporates both chains
and Move a leads to undesirable redundancy. Support for a chain-based
approach comes from Full Interpretation (FI) and the distribution of
thematic positions in chains (Chapter 1). Consider the following examples :
(1) There must have arrived many people.
(2) It seems that Mary is bright.
In (1) and (2) the expletives and their associates form a chain: [there, many
people] in (1), and [it, CP] in (2). Given that expletives receive no
interpretation at LF, the associate moves and replaces}adjoins to it, so that
FI is satisfied (Chomsky 1986, 1991). However, if the associate many people
moves in (1) then it should have scope over the modal must, contrary to fact.
If, on the other hand, movement does not take place, the question is how FI
is satisfied.
Brody argues that the same problem arises for other elements such as
traces of head- and NP-movement which do not qualify as variables and
therefore receive no interpretation at LF, but nevertheless must be present to
link the moved category to its thematic position. He argues that this
contradiction is solved once we take FI to apply not to single categories but
to chains. Thus once the expletive and the associate form a chain, as in
(1)–(2), FI is satisfied and there is no need for movement.
The distribution of thematic positions within a chain is captured under the
main thematic condition (MTC): only root positions can be thematic (the
237
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D-set). This implies that a chain can have more than one thematic position
provided it is a root one, as shown in chapter 3 regarding parasitic gaps. The
MTC itself follows from the Generalized Projection Principle in (3), which is
illustrated by the French example in (4) :
(3) Projectional requirements (i.e. categorial and selectional}thematic) can
only involve positions that belong to the D-set.
(4) Mary
x
embrasse
y
e
x
e
y
Pierre
Mary kisses Pierre
According to (3) the categorial (project a VP) and selectional}thematic
requirements of the verb embrasse are satisfied in the root e
y
position of the
[V, e
y
] chain (given that in French V is in I). Similarly the subject Mary is
selected in the root t
x
position (the VP-internal subject hypothesis).
Selectional and categorial features must identify all chain-positions.
Identification is achieved under feature percolation; since percolation is
always upwards, projectional requirements can only be satisfied at the root,
hence the MTC.
Syntactic structures are assembled under the operations of Project
(including chain formation) and Insert : once projection and chain formation
has taken place, lexical insertion takes place directly at LF. This process is
instantaneous and ensures that no intermediate structures are created, as
opposed to Chomsky’s (1993, 1995) cyclic derivations. In (4), then, each
category projects in its root position; placeholders are used in VP for the
subject and the object. The relevant chains are [Mary, e
x
] and [V, e
y
] The
next step involves insertion of lexical items and the LLF representation is
created. Lexical items are then already in their PF position at LF, so SPELL
OUT takes place directly from LF.
The question that arises at this point with respect to Form Chain is what
ensures that the right number of positions is present. Brody notes that this
reduces to the question of the lexical input. One could argue though that this
problem is overcome if Form Chain is somehow restricted by interpretation:
for example interpretive properties of V seem to require that the number of
empty positions be matched to the number of functional heads related to V,
such as T, Agr, C (i.e. the extended projection of V).
Further evidence in favor of a chain-based approach comes from
Subjacency effects (chapter 2). In standard terms overt movement of what in
(5a) gives rise to a Subjacency violation, while LF-movement does not, as the
indicated reading in (5b) shows:
(5) (a) ??What did John wonder who bought t?
(b) Who wondered who bought what?
(For which pair (x, y) x wondered who bought y.)
In the LLF framework the reading of (5b) is derived by the presence of a
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scope marker SM (an expletive) associated with the wh-in-situ (the
contentive) :
(6) SM
x
Who wondered who bought what
x
?
Brody offers an alternative generalization for (5) ; suppose that the relevant
distinction is not between overt vs. covert movement, but between primary
and secondary (wh-) chains : the former cannot cross islands, while the latter
can. In (5a) then the primary what-chain (i.e. the one that satisfies the ­wh
C under spec-head) crosses an island and ungrammaticality is predicted. In
(5b), on the other hand, the what-chain is secondary (the primary one is that
formed by who) and therefore can occur within an island, hence the
grammaticality. In other words secondary chains just, like parasitic gaps,
circumvent islands. Moreover, just like parasitic gaps, secondary chains
cannot be separated from the primary chain by more than one island:
(7) Who was against proposals to leave without waiting for whom?
(*Which pair (x, y) x was against proposals to leave without waiting
for y)
Thus Subjacency constrains both secondary and primary chains.
Wh-in-situ in Japanese-type languages can occur within multiple islands.
Following standard assumptions Brody suggests that Japanese exhibits large
scale pied-piping, allowing for the wh-feature to percolate and turn the whole
clause}island that contains the wh-element into a wh-phrase. The difference
then between English and Japanese is that the former, but not the latter, does
not allow for percolation of ­wh across sentential boundaries.
Although this approach derives the right results, one might wonder why
there should exist such a parameter that allows for feature percolation to be
freer in languages like Japanese. Alternatively what allows for feature
percolation, but not chain-formation, to cross islands in Japanese-type
languages, especially if feature percolation is a basic requirement on chains,
since it contributes to identification of all chain-members. In Brody’s system
feature percolation and chain-formation are connected. However, it seems
that in the case under discussion these two ‘mechanisms’ must be dissociated
in a rather ad hoc way. Of course such a solution seems to be necessary in
the absence of any other more satisfactory analysis of the Japanese data.
The possibility of multiple thematic positions in a chain, modulo the MTC,
is discussed in connection with parasitics gaps, as in (8) (Chapter 3) :
(8) Which book did you criticize without reading?
Brody argues that ‘although all positions must belong to some chain and
chains must be maximal, a given position may belong to more than one
chain’ (86). Thus (8) essentially involves the following two chains :
(9) [which book, t]
[which book, e]
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In (9) the MTC is satisfied: the only thematic positions are the root ones.
The well-known contrast between (10) and (11) is now accounted for:
(10) ?Who did Bill believe [t to have visited you [without you having
invited e]]?
(11) *Which girl did you expect t to meet everyone who liked t?
In both examples the primary gap occurs in subject position. In (10) the
parasitic gap is within an adjunct clause (an island), while in (11) it is within
a complement clause. (12) and (13) illustrate the relevant configurations and
chains for (10) and (11) respectively :
(12) (a) wh
x
tl
x
[
VP
t2
x
] [pg]
(b) [wh tl t2]
[wh tl pg]
(13) (a) wh
x
tl
x
[
VP
t2
x
[pg]]
(b) [wh tl t2 pg]
(pg¯parasitic gap)
t2 is the trace in spec, VP, the thematic position of the subject. t2 and pg
cannot be in the same chain in (12), since the former does not c-command the
latter and vice versa. Given that chains must be maximal, wh and tl (the
surface position of the subject) are included in both chains. In (13) t2 c-
commands the parasitic gap, which occurs within a complement clause, so
they are both included in the same chain. The ungrammaticality of (11) now
follows: the resulting chain contains two thematic positions, one of which
(namely t2) is non-root. In (10) though only the surface position of the
subject, tl, counts for the maximal chain, so there are two root thematic
positions, t2 and the parasitic gap. Thus the ungrammatical (11) is explained
as a violation of the MTC with no need for any extra machinery.
A clear advantage of this approach is that any c-command restrictions
between primary and parasitic gaps do not need to be stated specifically for
these constructions. Once chain-formation is taken to be the relevant notion,
the ungrammaticality of (11) is directly accounted for in chain-theoretic
terms. C-command only enters as a condition incorporated in chain-
formation.
Finally, Brody argues that the connection between parasitic gap chains
and wh-in-situ, in terms of circumventing islands, becomes more apparent
if the parasitic gap is taken to be associated with a scope marker in Spec, CP.
The wh-operator of the primary chain and the scope marker are united under
absorption. Although this makes the two constructions look alike, it is not
clear that this is necessary (at least for parasitic gaps), since both the parasitic
gap chain and the primary one ‘meet ’ to form a maximal chain under a c-
command (essentially connectedness) configuration.
There is one more point that I would like to raise in connection with the
MTC. Brody argues that the MTC accounts for the lack of movement from
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one thematic position to another: that would involve two thematic positions
of which only one is root (cf. (11)). Thus a verb like HIT in (14a) which assigns
a theta-role to its subject and a theta-role but no Case to its object cannot
exist. Let us furthermore assume the VP-shell configuration in (14b) in which
the light v has a different feature specification from V:
(14) (a) *John
x
HIT
(b) [John
x
I [
VP
t]
x
v [
VP
t2
x
HIT]]]
One could argue then that there are two different thematic root positions
involved: t1
x
selected by v, and t2
x
selected by HIT. However, given that t1
x
c-commands t2
x
they should both form a single (maximal) chain, exactly as
in the case of the ungrammatical (11). If so, the chain [John, t1, t2] includes
two thematic positions, one of which is non-root, violating the MTC.
Positional parameters are discussed in chapter 4. First, Brody argues that
the principle of Procrastinate (Chomsky 1993) which takes covert movement
to be the default option is undesirable since it implies that grammars that
show maximal differences between LF and PF are to be more highly valued.
The principle of Earliness (Pesetsky 1989) has the opposite effect : it forces
movement to take place as soon as possible, even if this operation may not
be necessary in later stages of the derivation. This contradiction does not
arise within the LLF model. Since lexical items are already in their PF
position at LF, ‘overt ’ movement from P1 to P2 means that the lexical item
is spelled out on the P2 position of the chain; ‘covert ’ movement from P1 to
P2 accordingly means that the lexical item is spelled out on the P1 position
of the chain; which position is spelled out is determined by the principle of
Transparency: ‘ the contentive category in the chain must be in the highest
position licensed by morphology’ (104). Thus in the LLF framework
‘strong’ features are simply those satisfied by categories (the contentive is in
P2), while ‘weak’ features are those satisfied by chains (the contentive is in
P1).
Consider for example wh-questions in English.
(15) (a) Who did you see?
(b) *scope marker
x
You saw who
x
?
In (15a) who satisfies the wh-criterion (which is now stated in terms of
chains). (15b), where a scope marker satisfies the wh-criterion, is ruled out as
a violation of Transparency: the wh-phrase does not occur in the highest
position licensed by morphology. In languages with partial wh-movement,
Transparency forces the contentive to be realised in the intermediate Spec,CP
(probably licensed as a focused phrase) while the matrix Spec,CP is occupied
by a scope marker (overt or empty) that marks scope and satisfies the wh-
criterion. The use of scope markers eliminates the need for LF movement
from an A«-position (i.e. the intermediate Spec,CP).
Thus Transparency seems to account for parametric variation in a
straightforward way. However, what needs to be discussed more is in what
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way the morphological properties of a given language determine the spell-out
positions in a chain. For example what exactly is the difference between
English and German wh-phrases so that the first allows for full extraction out
of a that-clause, while the latter moves the wh-phrase to an intermediate
position.
Quantifier Raising (QR) is discussed in connection with the absence of LF-
movement (although the status of QR as movement is in general debatable).
In the LLF framework one could assume that the scope position is marked
by a scope marker which enters a c}m-command relation with the quantifier
phrase (the scope relation does not need to be that of a chain). An issue
relating to QR is that of Antecedent Contained Deletion, as in (16) :
(16) (a) John ²suspected [everyone that Mary did]´.
(b) [Everyone that Mary did] John ²suspected t´.
(16b) is the QR-structure that Fiengo & May (1990) propose, so that infinite
regression is avoided, since the anaphoric VP is contained within its
antecedent (included in curly brackets in (16a)). Brody argues that QR in (16)
is not necessary (in any case it is excluded in the LLF model) once we assume
a modified version of the ‘vehicle change’ concept of Fiengo and May
(1990). In particular, (16a) can have the following LF-structure:
(17) John ²suspected [everyone that Mary did ²suspected t´]´
t stands for the variable correlate of the NP headed by the quantifier
everyone. (17) ensures that there is no complete identity between the elided
VP and its antecedent and infinite regression does not arise. This analysis is
in accordance with other recent proposals that take quantificational elements
to receive their interpretation in their surface position (cf. Reinhart 1995).
Finally, Brody considers reconstruction phenomena and argues (contra
Chomsky 1993) that at LF full copies are present in all chain positions.
Deletion of copies is a matter of PF and not of syntax. Consider (18) :
(18) Mary wondered [which claim that pictures of herself disturbed Bill ] he
made.
The presence of herself in the wh-associate forces the non-reconstructed
version, while proper application of principle C (i.e. he and Bill cannot be
coreferential) forces reconstruction. Brody argues that this contradiction is
solved if a full copy of the wh-phrase is present in both positions at LF:
(19) Mary wondered [which claim that pictures of herself disturbed Bill] he
made [which claim that pictures of herself disturbed Bill]
Principle A is satisfied since herself has a c-commanding antecedent in (at
least) one of the positions of the chain. Similarly, principle C correctly
excludes coreference between Bill and he in any of the positions. Thus the
presence of both copies allows for interpretation to be determined chain-
242
reviews
internally (i.e. in the relevant positions), while the only deletion rule that
applies is the result of SPELL OUT. In this respect the LF-structure is
indeterminate as desired (this is the principle of Partially Determined Full
Interpretation). This approach eliminates the problems that arise under
Chomsky’s analysis of copies : reconstruction effects are now accounted for
in a more straightforward way (although the discussion of A-chains and
copies is less clear).
As the above discussion shows the (L)LF approach provides a more
restrictive theory of grammar: the lexicon and PF have direct access to LF
with no intermediate levels of representations and}or derivations. Although
Chomksy’s (1993, 1995) Minimalist framework also takes LF and PF to be
the only levels of representation, it still allows for the same lexical item to
occur in two different positions at LF and PF in cases of covert movement,
maximizing the difference between PF and LF. The operation Move}Attract
captured under the mechanism of feature-checking also leads to redundancy
since it requires the same feature to occur twice, on the attractor and the
attractee, with subsequent deletion of one of the two in the syntax. In the
LLF model, on the other hand, the relevant feature appears only once and
is shared by all members of the chain; thus there is no deletion of
features}categories in syntax.
Before closing the discussion I would like to raise a final point regarding
the use of empty positions in chains. Brody argues for a representational
model of grammar, arguing that there is no derivational component
involved, and therefore no cyclic operations (recall also that Project and
Insert take place in one step). Note, however, that exactly as in the standard
cases of movement (head-, A-, and A«- movement) copies are present ; in
chain-theoretic terms copies are also required to be present in all chain-
positions. That is, Form Chain gives rise to a representation that involves a
number of copies not just in the head and the foot of the chain but also in
intermediate positions. Thus the representation assembled under non-cyclic
Project (and Insert) is very similar to that derived by a model that allows for
movement (cf. Manzini & Roussou (1997) for further discussion) ; thus
intermediate structures are replaced by the necessary presence of intermediate
copies. One would expect that in a radically-minimalist model there are no
intermediate chain positions either : what is relevant is those positions that
satisfy projectional requirements (LF) and Transparency (i.e. the spell-out).
Despite the above reservations, Brody’s book is a major contribution to
syntactic theory. It is very well written and the discussion is thorough and
original in both conceptual and empirical matters, based on a set of
minimalist assumptions. It is essential reading for anyone interested in
linguistic theory.
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Nigel Duffield, Particles and projections in Irish syntax (Studies in Natural
Language and Linguistic Theory 32). Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1995. Pp. xiv­372.
Reviewed by Andrew Carnie, Harvard University
When one works in a specialized field such as Celtic language syntax, it is a
rare pleasure when a whole book devoted to the grammar of one’s language
specialty appears in print. Although in recent years numerous papers have
addressed issues in the generative syntax of Irish, in the past 20 years only
two other books have been devoted solely to the topic : McCloskey (1979)
and Stenson (1981). Nigel Duffield’s book Particles and projections in
Irish syntax thus fills a very obvious void, being the first book in almost
fifteen years to examine the syntax of Irish from a generative (or more
precisely minimalist) perspective.
Duffield’s goal is a unified characterization of functional projections, the
particles that fill these projections, and word order alternations of both a
clausal and NP-internal nature. The first chapter of the book sets out the
scene in terms of the assumptions of minimalist syntax and some of the issues
and concerns raised by the grammar of Irish. The second and third chapters
deal with issues in the particle system of Irish, and in deriving VSO order
in tensed clauses. In the fourth chapter, Duffield looks at word order
phenomena in non-finite clauses (with a particular emphasis on Ulster Irish).
Finally, the last chapter revolves around the parallelisms to clausal syntax
found in the nominal system of Irish, comparing it in detail to similar systems
found in Semitic languages.
Throughout the book, there is an underlying theme which relates syntactic
structures to the well-known Initial Consonant Mutations (ICM) of Irish.
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From this perspective this book then is not only of interest to syntacticians,
but also to phonologists and morphologists interested in ICM. Duffield
departs from standard assumptions about ICMs (the idea that they are only
lexical properties of specific words), and claims there are two types of ICM
phenomena: Lexical and Functional. Lexical mutations are of the idio-
syncratic type associated with specific lexical items. Functional mutation, on
the other hand, is a syntactic phenomenon, occurring when certain functional
projections are lexicalized (either by particles or by head-moved lexical
items). (1) below is Duffield’s basic claim:
(1) (a) Lexicalized T!}D! triggers the Lenition F-mutation.
(b) Lexicalized C! triggers the Eclipsis (nasalization) F-mutation.
On the basis of this characterization, Duffield makes several very
controversial claims which we will consider in detail below.
In the second chapter of the book, Duffield develops a remarkably
elaborate system for deriving the basic VSO word order of tensed clauses. He
claims that subjects in Irish are VP internal in VSO clauses. More
controversially, he also claims that the verb in VSO structures is not at the
left edge of the inflectional complex, but rather in some relatively low head
(Agr(O)!) :
(2) [
CP
C!…[
TP
T! [
NEGP
Neg! [
AGRP
Agr!­V
V
[
VP
Subject…t
V
]]]]]
This contrasts heavily with most recent research in Irish syntax (see for
example Bobaljik & Carnie 1996, among others), where the verb is taken to
lie in the highest inflectional head below C!. The evidence that Duffield
presents for this approach comes from the particle system. Duffield observes
that the three heads not occupied by V at spellout (C!, Neg!, T!) form a
unitary class, in that they contain the information found in the preverbal
particles of the language:
(3) (a) Ni! thuigim.
neg understand
‘I do not understand.’
(b) Ar thuig tu! ?
[­Q]-past understand you
‘Do you understand’
(c) Du! irt sı! [
CP
na! r thuig tu! ].
said she that.neg.past understand you
‘She said that you don’t understand’
With respect to ICM, Duffield claims that if the T! head is in some way
lexicalized (either by negation or by the past tense morphemes do and -r),
then the T! head triggers lenition on the first consonant of the following verb.
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If on the other hand C! is in some way lexicalized, eclipsis}nasalization
occurs. Notice that there are two crucial parts to this analysis : first the verb
must not have raised through T!, since lexicalized T! is the trigger for the
mutation. This in turn forces the second crucial assumption: if the verb is
not in T!, then it must be lower (in Agr!), which means that post-verbal
subjects must be VP internal. Let us consider these two claims. First, let us
consider VP internal subjects. Bobaljik & Carnie (1996) claim on theoretical
grounds that by minimalist assumptions the movement of arguments in finite
clauses must be a superset of movement of arguments in non-finite contexts.
Non-finite clauses in Irish show a derived SOV word order, where the object
can be shown to have shifted around verb and subject to the specifier of some
agreement projection. Since the subject precedes the object, it follows that the
subject is also VP external. McCloskey (1996) presents evidence from VP-
adjoined adverbs like riamh ‘always}ever ’ that the subject must be external
to the VP. These adverbs appear between the surface subject position and the
surface object position in finite clauses, thus showing that the subject is VP
external. In chapter four, however, Duffield easily overcomes these objections
by splitting the verb phrase into two halves, with the upper VP containing the
subject, an intervening inflectional head (Asp!) whose specifier serves as the
overt landing site of the object, and a lower VP containing the thematic
position of the object :
(4) abc
(4) [
CP
C!…[
TP
T! [
NEGP
Neg! [
AGRP
Agr!­V
V
[
VP
Subj t
V
[
ASPP
Obj t
V
[
VP
t
V
t
obj
]]]]]]]
The other claim – that the verb does not move into T! – is more
controversial and difficult to confirm. As noted by Duffield himself, verbs in
Irish show a full range of tense inflectional suffixes. This is problematic for
the view that the verb is not in T!. Duffield attempts to account for this fact
by claiming that these markers do not show tense but rather mood and
aspect. To this reviewer this claim seems very strange. These morphemes
show a full range of tense forms ranging from past (-amar, !, etc.) to present
(-eann, etc.) to future (-faidh, etc.). The preverbal particles only seem to vary
on a past}non-past axis. It seems backwards to claim that the full range of
tense inflection is not T!, but the more limited set instantiates the node. It
should be noted, however, that Duffield’s basic claim can be maintained with
only a minor modification. O; Se! (1990) analyzes the temporal morphology
in Irish preverbal particles, and the equivalent particles in copular clauses,
as realis}irrealis mood. Duffield’s system translates directly into this
characterization. Mood is realized in the preverbal particle system and is
lexicalized as a lenition trigger. On a related note, Duffield seems to assume
that the only positioning of NegP is one below TP and above AgrP. Laka
(1991) argues for an A-bar projection lower than CP (and perhaps MoodP)
but higher than the highest A inflectional projection (TP or AgrP) : RP. This
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position is associated with negation in complementizer particles in Basque.
The extension to Irish should be obvious: Negation might be this R!, rather
than the Neg! (lower than T!) discussed by Duffield. What is particularly
interesting, however, is that the important insights of Duffield’s analysis can
be maintained independently of what actual functional projections are
involved.
In addition to this analysis of particles and VSO structure, the first chapter
of Duffield’s book contains an analysis of an otherwise puzzling phenomenon
in modern Irish: pronoun postposing. While in finite clauses with full NP
objects the word order is VSOX, the word order in clauses with weak
pronominal objects is VSXO:
(5) Bhuail me! leis an ord e!
hit I with the hammer it
‘I hit it with the hammer.’
Duffield explains this effect in terms of Wackernagelian second position,
where the pronoun occupies the head of WP (an A-bar projection higher
than TP but lower than C!), and the rest of the clause moves to the
specifier of WP, as part of a generalized topicalization operation:
(6) WP
W´
W TP
pronoun
This account also attempts to explain the apparent ‘reverse ’ order of clausal
adverbials found in Irish. If this account is correct then there should be a
direct correlation between reversed order adverbials and postposed pronouns
crosslinguistically. Only further comparative work will confirm whether this
prediction holds true or not. A more pressing problem has to do with the
limitations of the pronoun post-posing phenomenon. The above account
predicts that weak pronouns will follow any finite complements embedded
under TP (which in turn is in the specifier of WP). This is false (O; Siadhail
1989 : 209) :
(7) *Chuala me! raite [
CP
go mbı!odh se! ann] e!
heard I said that be.hab he there it
‘ I heard it said that he used to be there.’
cf. Chuala me! e! raite go mbı!odh se! ann.
Chuala me! raite e! go mbı!odh se! ann.
Pronoun-postposing is a strictly clause bound phenomenon.
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The strong claim of Duffield’s work is that in Irish, complementizers
always cause eclipsis}nasalization on the initial consonant of the following
word. As he notes, however, there are two glaring exceptions to this claim:
the negative complementizer found in non-finite clauses gan, which inflicts no
mutation, and the so called direct relative ([­wh]) complementizer aL",
which causes lenition. To explain these exceptions, Duffield claims neither of
these elements is in reality a complementizer, outward appearances to the
contrary. Gan, he claims, is a negative element that occupies the specifier of
NegP. This analysis seems both sound and plausible. The claim that aL is not
a complementizer is more controversial however, as among other things it
calls into question the well motivated analysis of Irish wh-complementizers
advanced by McCloskey (1979, 1990). Duffield claims that aL, unlike the
indirect relative marker aN (which is a complementizer in Duffield’s system),
is an element base adjoined to T!, thus accounting for the fact that it is a
leniter rather than an eclipsis}nasalization trigger. In order to account for the
fact that this morpheme appears overtly with wh-words and in other wh-
contexts such as relatives, Duffield claims that the specifier of TP may
function when overtly marked (by aL in Irish) as a Topic Phrase. As support
for this claim he notes that ‘when removed from context, many XP-aL-V-YP
strings are ambiguous between a relative-clause interpretation and a topic-
structure interpretation’ (196). I find this evidence confusing, since there are
many cases where XP-aN-V-VP strings with an unambiguous complementizer
aN also function like topicalization structures. This means that in Duffield’s
system there are at least three different locales for topicalization. First we
have the specifier of CP, headed by aN. Next there is the specifier of TP,
headed by aL. Finally, there is the specifier of WP, headed by weak
pronominals. This seems overly complex for a relatively straightforward
phenomenon, and only seems to be motivated# by the need to maintain the
mutation hypothesis in (1). Further problems arise with this analysis,
however. First, there is the problem of where the aL morpheme comes from.
Duffield does not want it to be generated under T!, since it has a
morphologically decomposable alternant that shows reflexes of the tense
[1] Orthographically this word is actually !a", phonologically it is a }b}. Duffield follows
McCloskey in writing this particle as aL (where L is a mnemonic for ‘ lenition’) to
distinguish it from the many other particles which are written a (such as the indirect relative
aN ).
[2] Duffield has other arguments for the idea that aL is not a complementizer. For example,
he presents citations to the claim that aL is historically derived from the same morpheme
that shows up marking the past}non-past distinction in complementizer and negative
heads. From the perspective of synchronic grammar this evidence is clearly weak. He also
claims that, unlike complementizers, in the class of irregular verbs, the suppletive
dependent form is never used with aL. Since the standard analysis of dependent}
independent verb form alternations is one of selection, this argument disappears, as one
could simply claim that aL selects independent forms, whereas other complementizers select
dependent forms.
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morpheme, a-rL ‘aL­past ’ ; instead he base generates it as adjoined to T!.
It remains a mystery as to why or how this should occur. A further problem
lies with the fact that the aL morpheme is well known to mark cyclic wh-
movement. In McCloskey’s classic (1990) analysis of wh-movement,
whenever a wh-word has moved through the specifier of a CP, the morpheme
aL appears as the head of that CP. Under Duffield’s analysis, this cyclic
behavior of aL is mysterious: by stipulation each clause embedded under a
wh-word must base generate a topic-identifying aL morpheme adjoined to its
T! head. The link to cyclic wh-movement seems to have been abandoned.
Chapter 4 represents one of the most polished and complete sections of
this book. It presents an analysis of SOV word order in Ulster infinitivals
in terms of object raising to a functional projection. Duffield argues that
object movement in Modern Irish is to some position internal to the VP;
namely to the specifier of AspectP, which is headed by another particle aL
(not to be confused with the one found in direct relatives) (8) :
(8) …[
VP
Subj v [
ASPP
Obj [
ASP
!
aL] [
VP
V t
obj
]]]
This derivation is highly convincing since, as noted above, it explains the
problematic adverbial placement facts, as well as some theoretical concerns.$
Duffield links this word order positioning to another phenomenon in the
language, the ag3 aL rule. In matrix clauses, when an object is extracted
from a clause bearing perfective aspect marking (ag), then the perfective
marker shifts form to aL, homophonous with the morpheme in (8) :
(9) [An t-airgead]
i
a bhı! an bhean aL thabhairt t
i
don fhear
the money wh was the woman prog give to.the man
‘the money that the woman was giving to the man’
cf. Bhı! an bhean ag tabhairt an airgid don fhear
‘The woman was giving the money to the man’.
On the basis of this fact, Duffield associates the aL morpheme in (8) to the
Aspectual head (rather than, for example, AgrO!). While Duffield’s
arguments about object movement to a position that is VP internal are
entirely convincing, the identification of the head aL as Asp! seems highly
suspect. First, there is the fact that this particle, like any other agreement
morpheme in Irish, shows a complete range of person forms when the subject
is null :
(10) Ba mhaith leis [pro moL}doL}aL}a}a! rN}bhu! rN}aN (m)b(h)ualadh
would-like with.3s 1s}2s}3ms}3fs}1pl}2pl}3pl hit
‘He would like to hit me}you}he}she}us}you(pl)}them.’
[3] In particular, Duffield solves the main problem with Bobaljik & Carnie’s (1996) analysis,
where the movement of a subject around the surface position of the object creates a
violation of the minimality based economy condition of shortest move.
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Second, there is a strong inconsistency in Duffield’s argumentation about this
particle. He observes ‘…the fact that aL directly substitutes for ag – as
opposed to being projected in addition to the progressive morpheme –
suggests that ‘‘Object Agreement ’’ and ‘‘Aspect Phrase ’’ are one and the
same VP-internal functional projection’ (246). Notice, however, that in
chapter 2, Duffield argued for three distinct functional heads above AgrP:
C!, T!, and Neg!, despite the fact that all the information contained in these
nodes is invariably contained in a single particle. Finally, Duffield seems to
have missed the fact that overt Aspect heads, such as the recent perfective
morpheme tar eis, can in fact appear overtly in conjunction with the aL
morpheme. Worse yet, these aspect morphemes are separated from aL by an
object :
(11) Ta! Sea! n tar eis an teach aL tho! ga! il
be John perf. the house aL build
‘John has just built the house.’
The fact that these aspectual elements are heads can be seen by the fact that
they block head movement of the verb to initial position and force auxiliary
insertion. These arguments all point to an analysis where the aL morpheme
in non-finite clauses and in sentences like (11) is identified with AgrO!.
In the last chapter, Duffield presents very convincing arguments from
adjective placement that the genitive constructions in Irish involve raising
both the head noun through two functional projections (Num!, Agr!) to D!
in a manner familiar from standard analyses of semitic Construct State
Nominals. The argumentation in this section is very thorough and complete,
so I will not discuss it further. However, I would like to take up the claim
made by Duffield that D!s, when lexicalized, are lenition triggers. As noted
above, Duffield makes a critical distinction between F(unctional)-mutation
and L(exical)-mutation. In particular, he claims that only functional
mutation spreads through syntactic categories, whereas lexical mutation does
not. Empirically this claim is simply false. Lexical mutation (such as that
triggered by plural masculine nouns) can spread to two conjoined adjectives :%
(12) na diailL bheaga agus mho! ra
the devils little and big
‘the big and small devils ’
The empirical coverage of Duffield’s work is impressive. Based on a
relatively simple assumption, he manages to develop a comprehensive (albeit
complex) system accounting for a wide variety of phenomena.
[4] A more accurate description of the data seems to be that lenition may spread, but eclipsis
is strictly local.
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This book is an outgrowth of Duffield’s (1991) dissertation, based in part
upon that work, in part on new research and new assumptions meeting more
current minimalist assumptions. The fact that this book is a revised version
of an older thesis, however, causes it to be a less useful tool than should be
merited by the analysis it contains. The book, in particular the second
chapter, moves back and forth from minimalist to preminimalist GB
assumptions with almost dizzying frequency, obscuring an otherwise
innovative and interesting analysis. The book is also painfully badly edited,
with many errors in the data, some of which are crucial& to the analysis. For
example, in chapter 5, example (16c) (279) shows that lexical eclipsis cannot
spread across a syntactic domain. The sentence is marked as grammatical,
but is crucially ungrammatical. A similar problem is seen in chapter 5,
example (14a) (277) (the asterisks here are mine, not Duffield’s) :
(13) (a) *a aon theach (b) *a h-aon theach (c) *a n-aon theach
his one house her one house their one house
These examples were meant to show that in most cases, lenition is a local
phenomenon, where the lenition trigger (aon) is string adjacent to the target
word (teach), crucially blocking other mutations (such as anti-lenition (13b)
and eclipsis (13c)) triggered by less adjacent particles. Although examples
exist which show this very phenomenon, the examples given above in (13) do
not as they are all ungrammatical – simply because }t} never lenites after a
homorganic nasal like the }n} at the end of aon. Duffield marks these
incorrectly as grammatical.
There are also surprising gaps and misattributions in the references of this
work. For example, there is no reference to Fassi Fehri’s (1993) work on
construct state nominals, which proposes a nearly identical DP internal
structure and movements to the one proposed here. The idea that Irish object
shift involves movement to the specifier of AspP is misattributed to Noonan
(1994), where in actuality Guilfoyle (1993) was the first to apply the analysis
to Irish. On page 259, the claim that the ag3 aL rule applies only in northern
dialects of Irish is attributed to McCloskey (1983). This is incorrect,
McCloskey never makes this claim, nor for that matter is the claim correct.
[5] There are some other less crucial but nonetheless unfortunate errors in the data as well : (i)
p. 19, example 20a the word by word gloss should read ‘the priest parish’ ; (ii) p. 148,
example 14a should read ‘…an t-amhra! n a ra! arı!s ’ ; (iii) p. 182, example 83b and 84b
should be ‘Na rudaı! ’ not ‘An rudaı! ’ ; (iv) p. 182, example 84b ‘Na rudaı! ’ is misglossed as
‘what ’, but should be ‘the things ’ ; (v) p. 191, example 101b ‘a dheir ’ should be ‘a deir ’ ;
(vi) p. 241, example 63f ‘ca! hair ’ should be ‘ca! air ’ ; (vii) p. 241, example 63f is incorrectly
translated. It actually means ‘We didn’t know what he was looking at ’ ; (viii) p. 244,
example 67b ‘Na cheisteanna’ should be ‘Na ceisteanna’ ; (ix) p. 277, example 13b ‘ar h-
ocht gcapall ’ should be ‘ar ocht gcapall ’ ; (x) p. 320, example 80b ‘dheatha! r ’ should be
‘deatha! r ’ (see discussion above in the main text about lenition of dentals). Many of these
errors involve mistakes in the initial consonant mutations, which is particularly unfortunate
in a work with a special focus on initial consonant mutations.
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This statement is important to Duffield’s analysis since it is meant to serve as
evidence for the functional identity of the aL and ag particles. What makes
the statement so particularly strange, is that in footnote 21, Duffield refers to
the application of this process in the southern dialect spoken in Du! n
Chaoin, in West Kerry – thus providing a clear counterexample to his own
prediction. One factor likely to frustrate the non-Celticist is in the
inconsistency in marking the ICMs: sometimes they are marked with
underlining, other times they are ignored.
It is thus a truly unfortunate fact that the poor editing and exposition in
this work obscures an otherwise well worked out and articulated theory, and
thus limits the usefulness of the book to people who are not experts in Celtic
syntax. If the reader can put these minutiae aside, however, they will
undoubtedly find insights in this work that will challenge their views on both
the syntax of Irish and, more generally, the minimalist approach to grammar.
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Paul Fletcher & Brian MacWhinney (eds.), The handbook of child language.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. Pp. x­786.
Reviewed by Margaret Deuchar, University of Wales, Bangor
This weighty volume brings together the contributions of thirty-six scholars
in the field of child language, writing between them a total of twenty-five
chapters. Coverage is broad, with nonnormal language development
included. The volume is attractively presented, and impressively free of
typographical errors.
There are three main parts to the volume: ‘Theory, method, and context ’,
‘The emergence and consolidation of linguistic abilities ’, and ‘Nonnormal
language development’. Meisel begins a section on ‘theoretical approaches ’
in the first part by presenting a useful, critical account of parameter setting
as an important current approach to language acquisition. He discusses the
controversial questions of what exactly should be parameterized and whether
or not parameters can be reset. He concludes that the popularity of the
parameter theory may be due to its attractiveness as a metaphor for the
human language capacity, although this is still poorly understood. In the
next chapter, Plunkett presents connectionism as an empiricist approach in
contrast to nativism. He argues that connectionist networks represent the
input as rich rather than impoverished, the latter view being characteristic of
the ‘symbolic ’ (linguistic) approach. Ochs and Schieffelin then argue for
greater consideration of the role of language socialization in grammatical
development. This involves the adoption of a more ethnographic approach
of the kind familiar to anthropologists and sociolinguists, but which is not
yet common among acquisition theorists. They argue that the absence of
such an approach in an area like bilingual acquisition explains a dearth of
studies on the acquisition of code-switching by young children. (This lack, is
however, beginning to be remedied in studies such as Petersen 1988, Lanza
1992, Deuchar 1995, Deuchar & Quay 1995, Vihman 1998.)
A subsection on ‘methods’ contains two chapters, one by Bates, Dale &
Thal, and the other by MacWhinney. In a study demonstrating the range of
individual differences in language acquisition, Bates et al. exemplify the
usefulness of the MacArthur Communicative Developmental Inventories
(CDIs), which involve collecting data based on parental report rather than
on recorded interactions. The use of CDIs in amassing large datasets and
focusing on representative behaviour is beginning to be more widely
accepted, and the value of the method is reflected in the chapter in various
new findings, such as dissociation between comprehension and production,
which have often previously been assumed to be associated in development.
MacWhinney then introduces and outlines the Child Language Data
Exchange System (CHILDES), a by now well established computerized
database of child language, together with systems of transcription and
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analysis. (More details of this can be found in MacWhinney 1995, the revised
version of the manual.) In his chapter MacWhinney reports on an exciting
new development whereby it will be possible to link digitized speech to
transcription. Some automatic phonetic transcription of high-frequency
words (in English, initially) will be available in addition to the currently
existing codes for manual phonetic transcription. However, I suggest there
may be a danger in providing too easily accessible transcriptions of adult
pronunciations to researchers who are possibly all too readily influenced by
adult models in transcribing child speech.
In a third subsection of Part I entitled ‘Social and contextual influences ’,
Snow reviews the now enormous literature on child directed speech (CDS)
and the role it plays in language acquisition. New points to be noted in this
area include a reconsideration of the role of negative evidence, exceptions to
‘universal ’ tendencies, the usefulness of the CHILDES database, and the
increase in crosslinguistic studies which allow the specific effects of CDS on
language structure to be more closely examined. Overall, in the empirical
studies reported, I note there is still a strong general emphasis on maternal
as opposed to other kinds of adult input, and I think it may now be time for
the balance to be redressed. Hickman’s chapter in the same subsection
focuses on how children learn to organise discourse, especially on how their
developing language represents the domains of person, space and time. In
general, she finds that discourse organisation is a late development in all
languages considered, but that the particular course of development is
affected by the language being acquired. In the next chapter on bilingual
acquisition, De Houwer reviews an impressively wide range of literature,
including relatively inaccessible studies. She also deals with many issues,
reporting a wide range of views, some of which have achieved more
consensus than others. For example, many would agree with her that it can
no longer be claimed that very young bilingual children use no translation
equivalents. On the other hand, a less common view is that one should limit
oneself to utterances consisting of elements from one language only in
studying the relationship between a young bilingual’s two languages (236).
One issue raised which has been widely discussed is that of whether there are
two grammatical systems from the start in a developing bilingual. My own
case study is cited in support of what De Houwer calls the ‘Separate
Development Hypothesis ’, but I would argue that separate morphosyntactic
systems can only be established from the point at which it is clear that the
child is speaking one language rather than another (Deuchar & Quay 1997).
I should also like to point out that the language environment of my case
study is inaccurately described. The correct details can be found in
Deuchar & Clark (1996).
In the final chapter of Part I, Ely & Berko Gleason’s chapter on
socialization across contexts clearly follows Ochs & Schieffelin’s advice
about the importance of studying language socialization, though they limit
254
reviews
themselves to ‘Western’, English-speaking children who are also mostly
middle class. Negative evidence is particularly clear in language socialization
since, as they say, parents teach their children what not to say as well as what
to say.
A chapter by Locke begins the subsection of Part II which deals with early
speech development. He describes infants as travelling ‘along a devel-
opmental growth path that leads to linguistic capacity’ (302) rather than
acquiring language as such. He emphasizes the importance of interactive and
attentional mechanisms. His approach would seem to apply particularly to
Western societies where children interact mainly with their mothers (as in the
chapter by Snow) and little is said about the role of other caregivers. One
strength of this chapter is that it mentions sign language acquisition, an area
sadly neglected in this otherwise comprehensive volume. In the next chapter,
Kent & Miolo focus specifically on the phonetic abilities of children in their
first year of life. One theme of their chapter is the issue of continuity versus
discontinuity between babbling and later speech development, on which they
find in favour of continuity in general, while acknowledging that there is
some counter-evidence. On the question of infant phonetic systems, they
make the important point that the possibility of making segmental
transcriptions of infants’ speech does not necessarily indicate that the infants
have segmental phonetic systems. Developing the same theme in the next
chapter, Menn & Stoel-Gammon suggest that while discontinuity with
speech applies to early babble, continuity is more characteristic of later
babble. They also argue that children’s earliest phonological units appear to
be whole words.
In a new subsection on ‘ learning words’, Barrett compares various
approaches and presents his own multiroute model of early lexical
development. Clark then reviews what is known about how children start
acquiring a lexicon, and also points out how little is known about the later
development of the lexicon. This is followed by an account of the role of verb
syntax in verb learning, which also helps to explain why verbs are acquired
relatively late.
In the next subsection on ‘ learning grammar’, Golinkoff & Hirsh-Pasek
show how a focus on language comprehension can reveal that the child has
capabilities which are not evident in language production. Following this,
Peters considers strategies in the acquisition of syntax, pointing to the
particular importance of prosody. Radford then sets out to demonstrate how
early sentence development can be explained within the framework of
government and binding theory. The same framework is used by de Villiers
to discuss the extent to which the empty category principle operates in the
same way for children as for adults.
The existence of Part III in this book, on nonnormal language
development, reflects the fact that this area has recently attracted more
interest as an important area of language acquisition. The first chapter in this
255
journal of linguistics
section, on computational approaches to the analysis of language impairment
by Miller & Klee, could in fact have been placed next to that by MacWhinney,
mentioned earlier, since both deal with the computer analysis of language,
and since Miller & Klee are concerned with the analysis of normal and
impaired child language. The SALT Computer Program, described in some
detail by Miller & Klee, could be compared to the CHILDES transcription
system described by Macwhinney, which also deals with both normal and
impaired language. Direct comparison of the two systems is unfortunately
not found in the Handbook, however. The next chapter, by Leonard, is the
first one specifically on language impairment, and argues that studies of
phonological impairment can be useful in evaluating models of phonological
development in general. Grammatical impairment is dealt with by Fletcher
& Ingham in the next chapter, which is a selective review showing the
difficulty of distinguishing linguistic from cognitive impairment. It includes
some interesting crosslinguistic data. However, in relation to German it
seems somewhat misleading to represent the verb-final patterns in SLI data
from Clahsen (1991) as evidence of a ‘grammatical deficit ’, since as Clahsen
himself points out in his book, verb-final patterns are very common in
normal German-speaking children also (see Clahsen 1991 : 194).
Craig, in her chapter on pragmatic impairments, argues for a functionalist
approach which focuses on the relation between form and function. This
perspective, she argues, is more revealing of pragmatic impairments than a
modular approach. The question of language development in Down
Syndrome children is first raised in chapter 4 by Bates et al., but then taken
up again in Chapman’s chapter. A wide range of literature is reviewed on
both production and comprehension. Chapman suggests that more research
should be conducted taking into account variation in auditory short-term
memory performance. Such research might help account for the success of
interventions based on visual representation such as signing, reading and
writing. Eisele and Aram’s chapter on lexical and grammatical development
in children with early hemisphere damage addresses fundamental questions
such as the extent to which functional units of language have neurological
correlates, and the extent to which these units can be localized in the brain.
They argue that, although there is evidence for a functionally modular
organization of language, the localization of various aspects of linguistic
behaviour in specific regions in the brain is still elusive. They also argue
against a simplistic view of the language lateralization hypothesis and
conclude that ‘a complete acquisition of language requires the normal
functioning of both hemispheres from the earliest point in development’
(688).
In all, I consider this to be a useful book, despite its weight and price. It
has something to offer both the child language specialist, who can follow up
specific themes through the extensive bibliography, and the general linguist,
to whom it provides a state of the art survey.
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Katalin E; . Kiss (ed.), Discourse configurational languages (Oxford Studies in
Comparative Syntax). New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Pp. i­393.
Reviewed by Anna Siewierska, Lancaster University
This volume is a collection of studies on how to analyse, within the generative
framework, clause structure in languages in which the discourse-semantic
functions of topic and}or focus are expressed via particular structural
relations. E; . Kiss terms such languages discourse configurational, hence the
title of the volume. Though the term discourse configurational language
suggests that the volume deals with a hitherto unrecognized language type,
this is not actually the case. The languages which are discourse con-
figurational in E; . Kiss’s sense, i.e. have a structural topic or (identificational)
focus position or both, include most of the major European languages, with
the notable exception of English, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian (E; . Kiss
to appear). Some other discourse configurational languages listed by E; . Kiss
in the introduction to the volume are: Korean, Chinese, Nepali, Japanese,
Hindi (Asia), Somali, Aghem, Kikuyu, Yoruba, Berber, some Chadic
languages (Africa), Haida, Omaha, Quechua, the Mayan languages (the
Americas) and Ilonggo (Austronesia). While discourse configurationality is
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evidently a widespread phenomenon, it has not until recently been considered
as requiring special treatment within generative syntax. This volume seeks to
rectify this situation by showing the necessity of taking discourse
configurational languages into account in formulating hypotheses about
Universal Grammar and elaborating the theoretical constructs which would
enable such languages to be incorporated within the existing models of
generative syntax.
The volume features an introduction by the editor and the following 11
papers : ‘Structural focus, structural case, and the notion of feature-
assignment’ by Julia Horvath; ‘Aspects of discourse configurationality in
Somali ’ by Marco Svolacchia, Lunella Mereu and Annarita Puglielli ;
‘Residual verb second and verb first in Basque’ by Jon Ortiz de Urbina;
‘Structural properties of information packaging in Catalan’ by Enric
Vallduvı! ; ‘An F position in Western Romance’ by Juan Uriagereka;
‘Focusing in Modern Greek’ by Ianthi Maria Tsimpli ; ‘NP movement,
operator movement, and scrambling in Hungarian’ by Katalin E; . Kiss ;
‘Discourse configurationality in Finnish’ by Maria Vilkuna; ‘Focus and
topic movement in Korean and licensing’ by Hyon Sook Choe; ‘The theory
of syntactic focalization based on a subcategorization feature of verbs’ by
Mi-Jeung Jo and ‘Focus in Quechua’ by Pieter Muysken. Most of the papers
elaborate on analyses previously advanced by the respective authors or other
contributors to the volume and consequently, for those unfamiliar with the
earlier work, make rather difficult reading. Though in the introduction E; .
Kiss provides a summary of the major issues dealt with in the volume, her
discussion is quite compact and it is not always clear which of the positions
that she discusses are currently held by the authors and to what extent their
views coincide with her own. This is particularly problematic with respect to
the notions of topic and focus which appear to be variously interpreted
throughout the volume. Thus, for example, whereas for E; . Kiss and some of
the other contributors, both notions are clearly semantic rather than
discourse based, for Vallduvı! they are informational notions. Informational
as opposed to purely identificational foci are also discussed in the articles by
Choe on Korean and by Svolacchia, Meru & Puglielli on Somali. Since
within the prescribed space limitations I cannot hope to do justice to the
contents of each paper, below I will only provide an overview of the range
of syntactic treatments of the topic and focus offered.
There is no consensus among the authors as to the treatment of the
structural topic. While it is considered to be external to the notional
predicate, the syntactic category of the notional predicate appears to be
subject to cross-linguistic variation. The topic is argued to be external to a VP
(Hungarian, Finnish), IP (Basque, Catalan, Somali, Korean, Hungarian),
T(ense)P (Greek, Hungarian) and Ev(idential) Phrase (Quechua). The actual
location of the topic in the languages considered also appears to vary. It is
claimed to occupy the specifier position of the CP (Somali, Korean) or TP
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(Hungarian) or to be adjoined to IP (Catalan), TP (Greek) or EvP
(Quechua). In languages in which the topic is accompanied by a resumptive
pronoun, i.e. Somali, Greek and Korean the topic is considered to be base
generated in its surface position rather than extracted from the predicate by
movement. Though in Greek this analysis is superficially incompatible with
the fact that the topic observes island constraints, generally taken as
indicative of movement, Tsimpli overcomes this problem by claiming that
topicalization in Greek involves movement of a null operator at LF rather
than at S-structure. An analogous analysis is proposed by Choe for Korean
topics, which he argues are restricted to NPs (contrary to Jo), to account for
the fact that subjacency does not hold in topic sentences while weak
crossover effects are observed. The presence of multiple topics also receives
various accounts. In Somali multi topics are derived by allowing the CP to
be freely recursive. In the case of Hungarian, E; . Kiss argues for placing one
topic in [Spec, TP] and adjoining the others to the TP. This, she claims, is
achieved by NP movement, a transformation which she redefines as creating
a primary predication relation between the moved category and the source
category.
Most of the discussions of focus build on the views of Horvath (1981,
1986) or Brody (1990). The former assumes that UG has a syntactic feature
[­Focus], the formal properties of which are on a par with structural case
features. The source and assigner of the focus feature is the V. In languages
with a structural focus, the V assigns the focus feature to a constituent that
it governs and is adjacent to. In languages with no structural focus, on the
other hand, the focus feature is assigned freely to any category, i.e., focus is
in-situ. According to Brody’s alternative analysis, focus is an abstract
functional head with its own projection. The focus operator occupies the
specifier position of this functional projection. The V, which optionally
carries the feature ­F, moves to F (the head of the FP projection) in part
by virtue of the Focus Criterion in (1).
(1) (a) The specifier of an FP must contain a [­F]-phrase.
(b) All [­F] phrases must be in an FP.
The parametric variation between languages with a structural focus position
and those with focus in-situ is captured with reference to the Focus Criterion,
in that in the former it is observed at S-structure while in the latter only at
LF.
In her contribution to the volume Horvath argues for a modified version
of her original analysis under which the focus feature is assigned not by the
V but by a functional head, the category of which (typically Infl or C) may
vary across languages. She also argues against attributing the difference
between languages with structural focus as compared to languages with focus
in-situ to parametric variation at the level of the Focus Criterion on the
grounds that this does not provide a systematic account of the cross-
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linguistic variation in the S-structure location of focus positions. A different
critique of Horvath’s original analysis is presented in the paper by Jo who
argues that focus is not a subcategorizational feature of V, but is related to
the V’s ability to select predicate complements. This, in the case of languages
in which predicate complements are adjacent to V, such as Korean and
Armenian, he interprets as being suggestive of the existence of an A«-position
within the VP. The A«-position is in turn a potential landing site for focus.
One of the advantages of this analysis suggested by Jo is that no stipulations
need to be made about the directionality of focus assignment (it follows from
the position of subcategorized nonarguments in a language) and furthermore
the directionality of focus assignment may be the opposite of that of case
assignment and theta-marking, as is the case in Hungarian.
Tsimpli in her contribution, on the other hand, adopts a version of the
structure proposed by Brody in which the value of the focus feature carried
by the head of the FP projection is subject to parametric variation; in
languages with structural focus the focus feature is always [­F], in languages
with focus in-situ it is [®F], and in languages such as Greek it may have
either value. Movement of a focus phrase to the specifier position in the
syntax is argued to follow from a modified version of the Focus-Criterion
which requires that a [­F] head must be in specifier-head agreement with a
[­F] operator. Movement of focus phrases at LF, in turn, is seen to be
motivated by scope requirements. A similar analysis of focus is advocated in
the paper by Choe for Korean, a language which allows more than one
constituent to bear focus. Choe argues that both information foci and
contrastive foci in Korean may move in syntax or at LF and are licensed in
the same way. He also argues for a parallelism between foci and wh-phrases
rather than one between foci and case assignment, as advocated by Horvath.
The paper by Uriagereka also assumes an FP projection but its head is not
only focus but any operator expressing point of view. Within the context of
the minimalist framework he elaborates an analysis which seeks to account
for some fundamental differences among Romance languages involving clitic
placement and different types of focusing in terms of the strength of the
features of F and the extent to which they are matched by the heads raised
to F.
In contrast to all the above analyses, Vallduvı! argues that in Catalan, no
focus movement is involved in focusing but rather the non-focused
constituents are moved whereas the focus remains in-situ. Under his analysis
everything that is not new information is dislocated from the IP. Vallduvı!,
unlike all the other contributors, also explicitly argues for a cross-
linguistically uniform abstract level of representation of Information
Structure which mediates between surface syntax and the informational
component.
In the light of the above analyses, discourse configurational languages do
not appear to require radical revisions of generative syntax, but rather
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relatively minor, though significant, adjustments such as extending the range
of functional categories or recognized syntactic features and their values and
allowing for a greater range of movements at S-structure as opposed to
merely LF. Nonetheless, the exact nature of these adjustments will
undoubtedly occupy much of linguistic theorizing in the years to come. The
proposals contained in the papers in this volume are bound to pave the way
for subsequent analyses. Any practitioner of generative syntax seriously
interested in cross-linguistic variation will need to consult them.
REFERENCES
Brody, M. (1990). Some remarks on the focus field in Hungarian. UCL Working Papers in
Linguistics 2. London: University College London. 201–226.
Horvath, J. (1981). Aspects of Hungarian syntax and the theory of grammar. Ph.D. dissertation,
UCLA.
Horvath, J. (1986). FOCUS in the theory of grammar and the syntax of Hungarian. Dordrecht :
Foris.
Kiss, E; . Katalin (to appear). Discourse configurationality in the languages of Europe. In
Siewierska, A. (ed.) Constituent order in the languages of Europe. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Author’s address: Department of Linguistics and Modern English Language,
Lancaster University,
Lancaster, LA YT,
U.K.
E-mail : A. Siewierska!lancaster.ac.uk
(Received 23 June 1997)
Peter Ladefoged & Ian Maddieson, The sounds of the world ’s languages.
Oxford & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996. Pp. xiv­425.
Reviewed by Katharine Davis, University of Washington
Peter Ladefoged and Ian Maddieson, well-known researchers at the
University of California at Los Angeles, have compiled a large number of
articulatory and acoustic studies into a framework that is accessible to
phoneticians and phonologists alike. At last the world has a comprehensive
text that describes, in the authors’ words, ‘…all the segments that are known
to distinguish lexical items within a language’ (2). As discussed in the first
chapter, this criterion defines a consistent level of linguistic analysis
throughout the book. For example, [<] is included in the discussion of
English because it distinguishes the word rung from run and rum ; the fact
that its distribution is limited does not negate its status as a distinctive sound.
In addition, prosodic features are not treated in this volume, even though
they may also distinguish words, because they are not segmental. Finally, the
authors note that their discussions are based largely on observations of
careful speech, the style most likely to exhibit distinctive productions.
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Subsequent chapters each deal with a particular class of speech sounds:
Places of Articulation, Stops, Nasals and Nasalized Consonants, Fricatives,
Laterals, Rhotics, Clicks, Vowels and Multiple Articulatory Gestures. A
Coda chapter provides a summary of phonetically supported oppositions
which the authors feel should be considered in universal feature theories, and
an Appendix lists the languages and language families mentioned throughout
the text. This book will find a wide audience of phoneticians, phonologists,
and other speech researchers, but it is by no means an introductory text.
Readers must be familiar with vocal tract anatomy and instrumental output
such as waveforms, spectrograms, spectra, palatograms, and air pressure
readings in order to fully appreciate the material presented.
The authors point out that, although evidence from a large number of
studies is presented, the book is not an exhaustive literature review.
Ladefoged & Maddieson have for the most part selected studies which give
the reader a coherent view of the sound in question. Considering that their
book is already over 400 pages long, this may be a wise choice ; however, it
does result in the exclusion of certain points of view. For example, in the
section on breathy voiced stops, although they mention that the amplitude
of vocal fold vibration may be attenuated before the stop release in languages
such as Hindi and Owerri Igbo (61), they do not report a study of Nepali
which shows that pre-release voicing may be entirely absent in some breathy
voiced stops (Poon & Mateer 1985). Thus, in the breathy stops of some
languages, pre-voicing may not be a required part of the contrast (such a
scenario would be allowed according to the stop phonation matrix on p. 100,
but this view is not considered explicitly in the text). In the same chapter,
there is a discussion of aspiration in which the authors conclude that ‘…
aspiration is a period after the release of a stricture and before the start of
regular voicing…’ (70), without mentioning that some researchers believe
the relevant segmentation point to be the onset of the following vowel’s
higher formants rather than the onset of periodicity (Fischer-Jorgensen &
Hutters 1981). The reader should bear in mind that, although the summaries
presented in The sounds of the world ’s languages are quite admirable, some
valid possibilities have indeed been left out.
Even considering the above caveat, it can be said that Ladefoged &
Maddieson provide the reader with a huge variety of phonetic facts. The
chapter on clicks is typical of the depth of information found in The sounds
of the world ’s languages. First the authors give a general description of the
sound class (‘… the essential component is the rarefaction of air enclosed
between two articulatory closures formed in the oral cavity, so that a loud
transient is produced when the more forward closure is released’ (246)),
followed by a brief summary of the language families and geographical
locations in which clicks are found. Next comes a detailed discussion of
articulatory properties, including place of articulation. Although languages
are not known to contrast clicks at more than five places, determining the
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actual place of articulation of any particular click can be complicated
because the extent of the occlusion varies during production. Evidence from
cine-radiological and palatographic studies sheds some light on this issue,
but it is noted that different speakers often use different production strategies
to achieve similar auditory results. Ladefoged & Maddieson then provide
acoustic descriptions of click contrasts based on waveform analyses. Crucial
factors include the amplitude and duration of noise at release, the timing of
maximal intensity, and region of spectral energy. The situation is further
complicated by the involvement of the posterior closure, laryngeal settings,
and nasality, which can result in productions such as the voiceless aspirated
velar nasal accompaniment to the alveolar click in Nama. All of these factors
are considered in depth using evidence from additional waveforms, air
pressure readings, oral and nasal airflow readings, and tables of minimal and
near-minimal contrasts. The potentially overwhelming amount of infor-
mation is clearly conveyed and never strays far from the essential question
of what determines phonetically and phonologically relevant click contrasts
(see pp. 275–278 for an interesting discussion of this issue).
Much of the material is instructional for its methodology as well as its
phonetic facts. For example, the section on the acoustic structure of voiced
nasals describes a study conducted by the authors. Ladefoged and Maddieson
guide the reader step-by-step through a process that enables them to infer the
articulation of Arrernte voiced nasals from acoustic data. First, it is
explained how the frequency of a nasal zero (area of reduced energy in the
frequency range or anti-resonance) has an inverse relationship to the volume
of the oral cavity in front of the velo-pharyngeal port. In other words, a
labial nasal should have the lowest frequency anti-resonance and a velar
nasal should have the highest. It is then explained how this inverse
relationship may be disturbed by changes in tongue body position, i.e. a
lower tongue position at a retracted location may result in a zero that is even
lower than that of a more forward closure position. The average zero
frequencies of Arrernte nasals turn out to be: dental¯ 1506, alveolar¯
1403, retroflex¯ 1634, and palato-alveolar¯ 2094. The lower value of the
alveolar compared to the dental suggests a laminal dental production. A
laminal dental will actually create a smaller oral cavity than an apical
alveolar due to the increased contact between the tongue surface and the roof
of the mouth. Thus, without any x-ray or palatogram equipment, the authors
have inferred the articulation of Arrernte nasal stops. This type of study is
especially valuable to phonologists who might want to confirm the feature
status of a particular segment. Such information can frequently be obtained
using simple phonetic methods, and the studies described in The sounds of the
world ’s languages may well encourage more phonologists to apply these
methods in their own research.
Some questions have so far defied phonetic explanation. Many linguists
have wondered what it is about Spanish taps, Finnish trills, English
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approximates, and German uvular fricatives that makes us consider them all
‘ r-like’. The chapter on rhotics addresses this question at length, giving the
most credence to Lindau’s (1985) suggestion that each one shares a common
property with every other, but that these shared properties are not consistent
across the whole class. That is, a trill’s short closure duration may resemble
a tap, and its open phase may resemble an approximate (245). Many
historical changes can be explained in this way, but Ladefoged & Maddieson
point out that non-rhotics can be just as similar (e.g. taps and trills are like
stops in that they all have closures). The rather disappointing, if accurate,
conclusion is that we think of these sounds as a class of rhotics because we
represent them all with the letter ‘r ’ in our orthography. It is comforting to
learn from the chapter on vowels that ‘Rhotic vowels always have a lowered
frequency of the third formant’ (313).
Diagrams, figures, tables, tracings, and pictures contribute enormously to
the book’s value. The illustrations are very informative, sometimes
reproduced from the original articles and sometimes provided by the
authors’ own archive of phonetic analyses. Occasionally, Ladefoged &
Maddieson might have made a better choice, for example, on p. 195,
spectrograms are presented to illustrate differences among four coronal
laterals ; although a table of formant values does appear nearby, spectra
would probably have made the point more clearly. However, apart from a
typo or two, the only obvious mistake appears on page 311 where the vocal
tract photos of strident v. non-strident vowels appear to be reversed relative
to the caption. On the whole, the authors have done a remarkable job
integrating hard phonetic data with the explanatory text.
Ladefoged & Maddieson have put together a well-written, well-organized
volume that is certain to become a standard reference in the field. The book
supplies excellent background information for phoneticians and phonologists
working on specific linguistic issues, and will also be very useful for computer
scientists and perception researchers who are often not aware of certain
phonetic properties and linguistic contrasts that may affect their research
results. The danger is that people will come to rely on it too heavily, perhaps
forgetting that new investigations are quite likely to turn up new facts. We
should not become complacent and take everything in The sounds of the
world ’s languages as the final answer. We should instead keep asking
questions, perfecting techniques, and uncovering new facts for the next
edition.
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David Pesetsky, Zero syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Pp. xviii­
351.
Reviewed by Thomas Ernst, Rutgers University
The main goal of Zero syntax is to meet the challenges posed by Experiencer
predicates (such as fear, anger, and annoy) for a restrictive view of the linking
between argument structure and syntax." A common assumption is that a
given set of h-roles is always to be mapped onto some particular array of
positions in a clause (formulated as the UTAH in Baker 1988). But if this
holds, then why should the Experiencer associated with fear be a subject,
while the Experiencer of frighten is an object? Pesetsky argues that a
combination of a fine-grained analysis of h-roles, plus some syntactic
movements after mapping, allow preserving the UTAH.
The book derives its title from Pesetsky’s use of abstract zero morphemes
to build the account of such alternations. Most centrally, Pesetsky proposes
a zero causative ‘CAUS’ to account for the fact that alongside object-
experiencer verbs like annoy there is no corresponding verb meaning ‘to be
annoyed’. He also posits a zero morpheme ‘SUG’ for cases like John’s
manner is proud, where the adjective is really [proud­SUG], i.e. ‘ suggestive
of pride’ (since only a sentient being, not a manner, can be proud), and a
zero-preposition G for double-object constructions, by which give John a
book is really give John [
PP
G a book].
Pesetsky’s justification of his analyses of CAUS and G, and of the
theoretical apparatus needed for this enterprise, form the bulk of the book.
Two proposals are especially crucial : his analysis of subject experiencer verbs
as bound roots combined with CAUS in syntax to form object-experiencer
verbs; and the dual-track system by which every sentence has two phrase
structures, one ‘ layered’ and one a ‘Cascade’. Below I will focus mostly on
these two proposals.
The first two chapters present an overall introduction and a discussion of
linking problems, showing what the general difficulty is and how specific
[1] I would like to thank David Pesetsky for discussion of some of the material in this review.
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approaches to the experiencer-predicate problem handle it. Chapter 3
distinguishes three types of Themes occurring with experiencer predicates ;
Target, Subject Matter, and Causer. Thus in (1a) (Pesetsky’s (30a)) the article
in the Times is a Target (‘evaluated’ in some way by Bill) ; in (1b) (¯ 36a)
John is the Experiencer and the television set the Subject Matter ; in (1c) the
latter is the Causer :
(1) (a) Bill was very angry at the article in the Times.
(b) John worried about the television set.
(c) The television set worried John.
(2) The article in the Times angered}enraged Bill.
It might have seemed that (2) (Pesetsky’s (30b)) poses a problem for the
UTAH, as it apparently shares one h-structure with (1a). But with the finer-
grained semantic distinctions shown here, it does not, and so the two
sentences need not be derivationally related. As (3) illustrates, Causer and
Target}Subject Matter may not cooccur; this Target}Subject Matter
Restriction (henceforth T}SMR) figures crucially in Pesetsky’s justification
of CAUS and Cascade structures :
(3) *The article in the Times angered Bill at the government.
Chapter 3 also provides a major piece of evidence for both SUG and CAUS,
from nominalization patterns. Given Myers’ Generalization, by which words
formed by zero-derivation block further derivational morphology, the data
shown in (4a, b) (Pesetsky’s (208b), (211b)) are accounted for. The causative
annoy is made up of a bound root oannoy­CAUS, and the presence of the
latter blocks nominalization; angry is [angry­SUG], and so likewise cannot
be nominalized:
(4) (a) *Our constant annoyance of Mary got on our nerves.
(b) Your remarks were angry}*your remarks’ anger
Chapter 4 provides a justification for Pesetsky’s bound-root analysis of
subject-experiencer predicates, analyzing them as parallel to French reflexive
verbs. Such roots require their external argument be Controlled, and this can
only be done either with reflexive clitics (as in French) or by replacing the
original external argument with Causer, in causatives. Thus (2) above allows
the overt verb anger (¯oanger­CAUSE, where oanger means ‘be angry’)
because the zero morpheme replaces the original T}SM argument of the
bound root with Causer. Chapter 5 provides justification for a third zero
morpheme G, a preposition introducing the theme argument in ditransitives
like give ; it Case-marks this theme, and incorporates into V, as indicated by
the predicted impossibility of nominalizations (*Sue’s gift of Mary (of ) a
book).
These strands of the analysis come together in chapter 6. Crucially, both
G and CAUS must raise, by head-movement, to incorporate with V. They do
266
reviews
so in a Cascade structure (a novel variant of ‘VP-shells ’ a' la Larson 1988),
illustrated in (5a, b), in which the first complement of V may occupy the Spec
of its sister, which is a PP (adapted from Pesetsky’s (511)–(512)) :
PPV
DP
give
P´
Goal
P PP
G
P´DP
Theme P
CAUS …
(b)(5) (a) V´
DP P´
Exper
P
at
PP
DP
Target
P´
DPP
CAUS Causer
V
√anger
PP
V´
(5a) is grammatical, with CAUS raising to G and the amalgam raising to
give. (5b) (for (3)) is ungrammatical, because o anger is illegitimate without
CAUS, but the latter cannot raise past at due to the Head Movement
Constraint. Thus the T}SMR is explained, given CAUS and this sort of
Cascade structure, because the P of the T}SM argument (at in (5b)) will
always block raising of CAUS, and without CAUS the Control requirement
on bound roots like o anger cannot be met. In legitimate cases like 1c Causer
raises to subject position (to avoid suppressing o anger’s h-role, a Projection
Principle violation, Pesetsky posits a base-generated CAUS affix on V so that
Causer is the subject to begin with). The lower CAUS must raise to check off
strong features (parallel to Chomsky’s 1995 Affix Checking operation).
The rest of chapters 6–7 fleshes out the principles needed for Cascade
syntax and the parallel, linked system of Layered syntax, i.e. the more tra-
ditional disposition of complements as sisters in a flat structure, with adjuncts
adjoined above them. The former is necessary to handle the so-called Barss-
Lasnik effects illustrated in (6), which motivated the VP-shell family of
analyses (by supporting ‘down-to-the-right ’ mapping of double objects as in
(5a), while Layered structure is still needed to capture most patterns of
constituency and semantic interpretation.
(6) (a) The therapist gave Karen
i
herself
i
. (Anaphor-Binding)
(b) They gave every worker
i
his
i
paycheck. (Pronoun-Binding)
Zero syntax is a well written book, couched for the most part in clear,
precise statements, with useful interim summaries, statements of goals, and
267
journal of linguistics
other signposts for the reader. It is well thought-out and organized, it
attempts to cover a wide range of related data, and, notably, for the most
part it is careful in identifying and addressing potential problems. It has no
major editorial problems, with very few typographical errors and a useful
index.
Of course, the more important question is whether Pesetsky’s analysis
stands up, and here the answer is less clear. Four points bear mentioning in
evaluating the success of his proposals.
(i) The data are often murky, with conflicting or overly subtle judgments on
crucial sentences. For example, the analysis in (5a) requires contrasts like
(7a, b) to justify the causative nature of double object sentences (Pesetsky’s
(494), from Oehrle 1976).
(7) (a) The war years gave Mailer his first big success.
(b) *The war years give his first big success to Mailer.
Everyone I have consulted finds (7b) slightly odd at worst, and perfect with
a big success. Similarly, Pesetsky argues from cases like (8) (his (294b)) that
reflexives are barred from by-phrases, a fact used to avoid a problem for his
bound-root analysis (102 ff.).
(8) ?*Bill was taught by himself to ride a bicycle.
Again, most people I have consulted find (8) only slightly bad, and perfect
with contrast on himself, especially if the PP is extraposed; what
unacceptability there is in (7)–(8) may surely be chalked up to low-level
pragmatic factors, as has often been pointed out.
(ii) Several counterexamples to his proposals can be handled only at some
cost. (9a) should only be possible with CAUS raising to o irritate as in (5b),
since with blocks this movement just as at does for (3) ; in (9b) (Pesetsky’s
(538a)) into should do likewise.
(9) (a) Mary irritated John with her mistakes.
(b) John broke the cookie into little pieces.
Pesetsky proposes that in cases like (9b) ‘weak features ’ on the verbal affix
CAUS allow the lower, zero-preposition CAUS not to raise, and no Head
Movement Constraint violation results. But this is a stipulative move, in the
absence of independent evidence for when features are weak and when they
are strong. As for (9a), it is crucial that prepositional CAUS be an adjunct,
so that it occurs lower than these PPs in (5b), so perhaps it could be
accounted for if with her mistakes is even lower. But this begs the question
of why adjunct CAUS occurs higher than a (rather argument-like)
instrumental PP.
Similarly, if ditransitives like give always take an NP and a PP (headed by
either G or to}for) as in (5a), we should not find the distinction in (10a, b)
268
reviews
(which follows naturally if the NP}PP difference is maintained for the second
complement).
(10) (a) *Fran gave Jim quietly [
PP
G a book].
(b) ?Fran gave a book quietly [
PP
to Jim].
(iii) Despite Pesetsky’s care in justifying his positions, they raise many
theoretical questions. For example, why should only the zero-preposition G
incorporate into English verbs – that is, why doesn’t its overt analog to
incorporate, parallel to Bantu applicative morphemes (Baker 1988)? Also,
can we live with an analysis requiring several CAUS or G morphemes, with
different properties (195, 154), all abstract and detectable only indirectly?
(iv) Lastly, although Pesetsky carefully works out the required principles
and the correspondences, the dual system including both Cascade and
Layered syntax is a substantial addition of machinery to the theory. It is
largely motivated by the fact that VP-shell analyses get many constituency
and interpretation facts wrong – these are to be represented instead on
Layered structures. But the main motivation for VP-shells depended on the
rejection of precedence as a structural condition to handle Barss-Lasnik
effects. To my knowledge, no defense of VP-shell theories has given an
argument against precedence aside from its being unnecessary and thus
eliminable. Yet if it is retained (see Jackendoff 1990, Williams 1993, Ernst
1994 ; even Pesetsky invokes precedence, e.g. p. 234), a major argument for
VP-shells loses its force, and so, correspondingly, do Cascades. Since one
specific justification for Pesetsky’s Cascade version of VP shells (its solving
the problem that the c-command-based conditions reponsible for Barss-
Lasnik effects seem to ignore c-command in PPs) is mitigated by the existence
of other possible solutions within a traditional layered structure, the
independent motivation for Cascades is weakened. It may be that the success
of Pesetsky’s proposals provides compensating evidence, but as long as one
still admits the need for traditional, layered syntax, one must have very
strong justification for Cascades to offset the addition of complexity that they
represent.
The conclusion must be that the proverbial jury is still out on whether
Pesetsky is right about zero morphemes, Cascades, the bound-root analysis
of subject-experiencer predicates and the specific mechanisms that tie these
together.
However, we must balance this with the richness of Pesetsky’s proposals,
his serious attempt to reconcile evidence for Cascades v. evidence for Layered
syntax, and his attention to both empirical and theoretical detail. From this
perspective, Zero syntax is valuable for its ability to raise interesting issues
and provide provocative data. If for nothing else, Pesetsky’s fine-grained
treatment of experiencer predicates, with its detailed consideration of h-roles,
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nominalization possibilities, and so on, is useful in considering the linking
problem. His proposal that causation may be introduced (at least in part) by
an adjunct preposition has implications for the analysis of ergatives and
resultative constructions, especially with respect to the issue of lexical v.
syntactic derivation. And it also forces consideration of distinctions among
adjuncts and of the argument}adjunct distinction: CAUS must be mapped
onto a lower position than some (other) adjuncts (recall (9a)), and Pesetsky’s
account of adjunct islands must recognize a group of adjuncts which act
somewhat like complements.
Finally, there are two areas that seem to me especially under-discussed, for
which Pesetsky’s ideas are particularly useful. First, he accords a special role
to prepositions in Cascades. Though he solves the c-command problem at a
cost, his careful working out of the phrase structural and h-theoretical
implications of prepositions’ role in Cascades marks Zero syntax as one of
those rare books that take prepositions seriously.
Second, there is the matter of the two sets of phenomena that appear to
motivate both Cascades}VP-shells and Layered syntax. Since Larson (1988)
the VP-shell approach has become a (perhaps the) major conception of VP-
structure, to the point where Kayne (1994) and its derivatives completely
deny the possibility of right-adjunction. Pesetsky squarely faces the strong
evidence for Layered, adjoin-up-to-the-right phrase structure, and is one of
the very few works that attempts to reconcile the competing evidence. This
alone is worth the price of the book.
In sum, Zero syntax is a thought-provoking treatise on experiencer verbs
and phrase structure, with specific analyses that may meet with skepticism,
but also rich in ideas and carefully worked out detail. Considered alongside
the many mere mechanical applications of the latest theoretical fad, it stands
out favorably.
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Neil Smith and Ianthi-Maria Tsimpli, The mind of a savant: language learning
and modularity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995. Pp. xviii­243.
Reviewed by Luca Bonatti, University of Paris VIII at Saint Denis and
New York University
This is a very interesting book that any linguist, cognitive scientist or
philosopher of mind will love to read. It is a single case study of a savant,
Christopher (C), with exceptional language abilities. Generally, savants are
very good at some specific cognitive domains but their mastery of language
is poor. As Smith & Tsimpli observe, the converse is very rare and this is
already a good reason to appreciate their book, which offers the most
detailed existing analysis of a case of this sort.
Smith & Tsimpli have two main objectives. One is descriptive ; they
carefully assess C’s deficits and abilities, as the eyes of the linguist would see
them. The other is more properly theoretical. They use C’s case to test
Fodor’s modularity thesis and Anderson’s theory of intelligence, and to draw
general conclusions about the organization of the mind. While I think that
their first task has been achieved, I have some doubts that C’s case is really
appropriate for their second task. I will begin by presenting and critically
discussing their descriptive work; I will then examine their more general
conclusions for cognitive architecture.
C, a thirty-three year old right-handed native English male, was born with
a damaged brain, possibly as a consequence of hydrocephaly. Recent MRI
showed a ‘moderate cerebral atrophy with wide sulci over both hemispheres ’
(4), that is, a diffused malformation causing overall retardation and
malfunctions. Smith & Tsimpli document its quite severe effects on C. His
hand-eye coordination is so poor that in his ordinary life he is unable to look
after himself. His cognitive abilities are no less impaired. In many non verbal
tests C performs roughly at mental age 9. He fails Piaget’s conservation of
number task, as well as the false belief task that four-year olds, but not
autistic children, pass."
Yet in striking contrast, as Smith & Tsimpli document, his performance on
standard verbal tests is normal or better than normal. More strikingly, he has
some degree of knowledge ‘ranging from fluency to the bare elements ’ (12)
of some fifteen languages, and can learn traits of new languages very fast.
Still, in spite of his exceptional abilities, C’s linguistic competence is not
uniform. He finds it easy to acquire the lexicon and some morphosyntactic
properties of a language, but although he can do literal translation across
languages, when translating he often misses the intended sense and ‘produces
[1] However, C does succeed in a version of it, the ‘Smarties ’ task. Smith & Tsimpli have an
elegant explanation for this apparent inconsistency that I cannot discuss for lack of space.
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an output that is flawed to the point of incoherence’ (156) even in the
languages he knows well. Add to this complicated picture the fact that even
in his native language C’s performance is not flawless.
What could generate such a complex cognitive profile? What does C really
know about languages, that allows him to be so proficient in spite of his
deficits, and why are his linguistic abilities, albeit exceptional, always
limited? Smith & Tsimpli try to clarify these difficult points with a clever
series of studies. They first try to assess C’s native language proficiency and
the nature of his violations from the norm (Ch. 2). They further explore how
C masters languages that he learned without explicitly controlled tutoring
(Ch. 3). Then (Ch. 4) they set up two more controlled cases ideally suited to
assessing C’s learning strategies. In the first one, Smith & Tsimpli teach him
Berber, a real (hence possible) natural language previously unknown to him.
In the second, they invent a non-existent language – Epun – whose properties
are not shared by any existing and probably by any possible natural
language. Crucially, in both case studies the order and nature of the data
presented to C was monitored and in the second his learning patterns were
compared to those of normal subjects. So Smith & Tsimpli put themselves
and the reader in an optimal position to explore C’s learning mechanism and
its sensitivity to linguistic universals. The plan is very well conceived. Let me
sum up Smith & Tsimpli’s main conclusions on these topics.
After carefully analyzing C’s natural language proficiency, Smith &
Tsimpli argue that his competence can be considered intact. The conclusion
is not trivial because C does diverge from normal speakers in ways that might
indicate a defective grammar. For example, he rejects sentences involving
topicalization, dislocation and sometimes extraposition.
Their argument has two steps. First, they show that C also deviates from
the average speaker in other disparate domains. He does not seem to fully
understand ironies, metaphors, and puns; he tends to interpret rhetorical
questions literally ; he doesn’t accept sentences when language is mentioned
rather than used; and he also finds garden-path and center-embedding
constructions exceedingly difficult. Smith & Tsimpli suggest that all these
contexts have two things in common. They require many computations (e.g.
center-embedding) and}or interpretive, or ‘metarepresentational ’ second-
order, abilities (e.g. ironies and rhetorical questions). Both factors – and this
is the important fact – are beyond grammar proper.
Second, they tentatively (but convincingly) argue that those same two
factors that evidently cause C many difficulties suffice to explain his rejection
of topicalizations, dislocations and extrapositions. Such structures require
both properly syntactic operations, such as operation-variable structures or
binding at LF, and a further distinct, post-LF level for coreference
assignments. Because, as Smith & Tsimpli show, wh-movement constructions
or relative clauses pose him no difficulties, Smith & Tsimpli conclude that C
masters the necessary syntactic operations and therefore his deviant
272
reviews
judgments must be caused by difficulties at this further, post-grammatical
level of representation. This, like other problematic contexts for C, requires
extra processing efforts that tax C’s central abilities too heavily (56–57). Thus
C’s deviations from native speakers’ judgments come from the interface
between grammar and central processes, and are not due to grammatical
deficits.
Their conclusion is well argued, but maybe too well argued. There is an
alternative possibility that doesn’t require all their fine-grained syntactic
analyses : C’s reported deviant judgments might just depend on his
interpretation of the tasks. Smith & Tsimpli often notice his excessive
willingness to cooperate with the linguist, as if he were almost obsessively
concerned with form exactness. So, perhaps he answers like we would do if
we were asked to be picky and single out the less prototypical (more
‘awkward’) English constructions. But if I am right, in this case (although not
in general ; see below) so much the better for Smith & Tsimpli’s conclusion.
If C’s odd linguistic judgments are an effect of task interpretation, this is a
further, more direct reason to conclude with them that his native linguistic
competence is intact.
But what really makes C special is his exceptional foreign language
competence, so it is very important to be clear on what this competence is.
There, however, matters are much more complex.
Smith & Tsimpli first describe C’s proficiency with languages learned
without controlled tutoring (mostly Greek and Spanish), also trying to draw
lessons for current debates in second language acquisition. I cannot do
justice to their detailed analysis here and will concentrate on their main
conclusion as I understand it. Across many different tests, Smith & Tsimpli
constantly find that C masters and learns the vocabularies of foreign
languages much better than their grammars. So Smith & Tsimpli write that
‘ the basis of C’s exceptional second language learning abilities lies in his
‘‘enhanced’’ lexical sub-component…in contrast, structural differences
between his first and other languages appear difficult for him…’ (85). Also,
L1 grammatical interferences in C’s L2 productions are ‘overwhelming’ and
‘abnormally persistent ’ (81 ; see also 119–120).
How should one interpret this difference between lexical and grammatical
abilities? There are at least two, quite different, possibilities. One is to say
that C doesn’t really know foreign languages, but only their vocabularies.
The other is to say that C really knows the languages – hence their grammars
too – but for some reason he cannot deploy his grammatical knowledge as
clearly and fast as his morpholexical knowledge. Smith & Tsimpli envision
both possibilities, but don’t clearly adopt one. At times they suggest that
perhaps C has only one grammar, that is, that ‘C’s syntax is basically English
with a range of alternative veneers ’ (122), the deviations from English (such
as C’s acceptance of null subjects in Greek, Spanish and Italian) being easily
explained by low-level generalizations over the morphological component.
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Other times they suggest that C’s bad performance is due to ‘grammatical
inhibition’ (121) caused by the high computational costs of syntax (as
opposed to lexical) access and processing. The two explanations, although
not incompatible, are different. The latter explains C’s poor grammatical
abilities by appeal to performance flaws (once again, a ‘flawed interaction of
the modular and the central ’ (121)) in the presence of a possibly rich L2
grammatical knowledge, whereas the former denies that C knows L2
grammars. Even if it is certainly difficult to embrace one single explanation,
it does make a difference for the value of Smith & Tsimpli’s analysis which
one is right. Often Smith & Tsimpli use C to elucidate some issues in L2
learning that are unresolved even for normal subjects. Notably, they ask
whether L2 acquisition involves parameter resetting. They spend many pages
in exploring the alternatives, and try to argue that in C’s case it doesn’t.
However, if the first possibility holds and C only knows English grammar,
then this issue does not even arise. But if the second possibility holds and C
does indeed know many grammars, then all such parts of the book are
entirely to the point. Also the reliability of C’s metalinguistic judgments
depends on which explanation is correct. If C always responds by consulting
only L1 grammar, then his L2 judgments are just native intuitions in another
guise and give no information on his second languages. If, instead, C does
know L2 grammars, then his intuitions may reflect them and Smith &
Tsimpli’s detailed analyses are worth the effort. Smith & Tsimpli are aware
of the problem (see p. 122) but leave it as they find it.
Uncertainty on this point also partly affects the last (otherwise excellent)
series of studies, aimed at assessing C’s learning strategies under controlled
conditions. Smith & Tsimpli state that, in teaching C new languages by
controlling the order of data made available to him, they want to ‘test the
predictions made by the principles and parameters framework of current
linguistic theory’ (123). However, their aim makes sense only under the
assumption that C does indeed learn grammars. Yet, their results are often
compatible with the possibility that, confronted with a new language, C only
minimally accommodates English to the new lexicon and does not acquire a
grammar at all. So for example Smith & Tsimpli test whether, in the absence
of positive relevant data, C can realize that Berber (which is generally VSO
but still allows SVO in declarative clauses, and allows null subject
constructions) has prepositions rather than postpositions and is pro-drop. C
does seem to get both facts right, but what should one conclude from this?
English too has prepositions, so this is the null hypothesis anyhow. And C
might accept Berber’s null subject sentences not because, as Smith & Tsimpli
claim, his generalizations are achieved ‘via the pressure of UG’ (137), but for
other totally different reasons. He might use rules of thumb such as ‘Rich
morphology, no obligatory subject ’ obtained through general induction or
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by analogy with other pro-drop languages like Italian, to which he has been
exposed.#
In fact, if C’s generalization were grammatical in nature and taken ‘under
the pressure of UG’, then we would expect other consistent behaviors that
C doesn’t exhibit. Consider for example the gap between sentence acceptance
and sentence production. Smith & Tsimpli find that C accepts Berber
sentences whose structures differ from English (e.g. null subject sentences, or
VSO constructions), but he produces only Berber sentences with English
word order. Had he made a generalization about the grammar of Berber,
why should he apply it in parsing mode and not in production mode? If
anything, one should expect the opposite. Furthermore, he rejects other
constructions that should be associated with null subject parameter setting.
Smith & Tsimpli interpret this as evidence that C does not reset parameters
in L2 learning (132 ; 137), by evidently assuming that C does learn a grammar
for Berber. But all these discrepancies might mean that C is not learning a
grammar at all, but just using English. A fortiori, surely he is not resetting
parameters, but this is trivial and uninformative for L2 learning.
Once again, Smith & Tsimpli don’t exclude this possibility. They write that
‘ it is possible that despite speaking many languages, C really only has one
grammar’ (129). They resort again to the difference between encapsulated
and central processes, arguing that a line should be drawn between ‘those
aspects of [C’s] linguistic behavior that are a function of his encapsulated
language faculty and those that are a function of his very considerable
encyclopedic knowledge’ (129) and evoke the possibility that C produces
Berber SVO constructions because his encapsulated (English?) grammar
leads him to do it unconsciously and automatically, whereas he accepts VSO
constructions because his encyclopedic knowledge makes him consciously
aware that such order exists (131). But this amounts to the recognition that,
also for Berber, C’s knowledge is not strictly speaking grammatical
knowledge, and this has the further consequence that Smith & Tsimpli’s
detailed linguistic analyses often ask questions that C’s case may not be
suited to answer.
A more complex pattern emerges from the last type of investigation Smith
& Tsimpli undertake. They invent a language, Epun, which includes rules
that don’t exist in any known language and are likely to be linguistically (but
not logically) impossible. So in Epun emphasis is expressed with a suffix
occurring at a fixed (structure-independent) ordinal position in a sentence,
and this is incompatible with basic principles of linguistic theory. Epun also
violates apparently universal morphosyntactic principles, in that it expresses
agreement between verbs and complex co-ordinate noun phrases by means of
[2] Indeed, C also accepts – although he doesn’t produce – sentences with freer word order
than Berber allows, like V XP S sentences that are ungrammatical in Berber but not in
Italian.
275
journal of linguistics
constructions like ‘I and Mary love3rd-person-feminine-plural flowers ’.
Notice, however, that agreement violations like these obviously are less
extreme and of a different nature than the presence of structure-independent
syntactic constructions.
Other rules, albeit structure-dependent, still violate some conditions on
UG. So Epun has no overt negation: whereas the normal word order of
positive sentences is SV(O), negation is expressed by a word order change
into VS(O), without any morphological change. Smith & Tsimpli hold that
a formal account of such a rule would appeal to obligatory verb raising in
negative sentences, which in its turn would require a structure having both
the head and the specifier of NEG empty, ad this runs counter to UG because
it violates recoverability conditions.$
Smith & Tsimpli compare C’s learning patterns for Epun with that of
controls (beginning linguistics students) and find three interesting results.
First, neither C nor the controls were able to guess the right syntactic rule
for impossible structure-independent operations (emphasis). Second, C – but
not controls – could find at least one of the odd morphological rules for
agreement. Third, controls – but not C – could discover impossible structure-
dependent rules (e.g. negation). Smith & Tsimpli interpret the first finding as
a demonstration that ‘strong’ violations of basic principles of UG are too
difficult for everybody, whereas they tentatively take the second as a further
demonstration that C’s morphological abilities are superior to his syntactic
abilities. But they rightly proceed with care here, given the sharp difference
in the kinds of violations mentioned above. As for the third finding, once
again they appeal to the difference between modular and central processes.
They argue that when a rule is not ‘strongly’ impossible but nevertheless
forbidden by UG, normal subjects can recover it by using central resources,
but C’s poor general intelligence forbids him to do so – hence controls’
success and C’s failure.
Thus general resources, syntax and lexicon all have their own role to play.
When UG really forbids something, nobody can learn, whether by ‘ linguistic ’
or ‘general ’ means. When, instead, UG is only ‘weakly’ violated, general
intelligence can succeed where modular syntax fails. And, as if on a parallel
track, morphology deploys its own learning procedures independent from
both syntax and general learning, as witnessed by C’s success in retrieving
odd morphological rules where normal controls fail.
This is what Smith & Tsimpli’s excellent descriptive work tells us. It is now
time to see how they think it supports the general image of the mind they
propose.
Let me begin with a note of caution. It is not at all easy to evaluate Smith
[3] It should be noticed, however, that the rule is also semantically incorrect, because it
wouldn’t allow for negation to range over complex sentences containing several main
clauses tied by propositional connectives like ‘It is not the case that A or B or C and D’.
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& Tsimpli’s overall model. One source of difficulty is inherent in any single
case study: conclusions on such a basis, whether positive or negative, are
always risky. To be sure, Smith & Tsimpli don’t base their model on C:
rather, they use C to confirm and sometimes accommodate a model they
already possess. But then its overall plausibility is independent of the present
case study and a fair assessment would require a detailed analysis of each of
their numerous proposals. However, the greatest source of difficulty comes
from Smith & Tsimpli’s change in tactics. In their last chapter, they abandon
the carefully slow path followed in the analysis of C’s linguistic abilities, shift
the engine into fifth gear and submerge the reader with a cascade of boxes,
and of hypotheses about their interconnections and their accessibility. All
this, once again, goes well beyond C’s case.
So, rather than discussing their model, I will limit myself to some simpler
tasks. I will first show how Smith & Tsimpli explain C’s performance by
means of some of its aspects. I will then present and criticize Smith &
Tsimpli’s argument that C’s case calls for a modification of Fodor’s
modularity thesis and Anderson’s theory of intelligence.
I have already shown how the interplay between language structures and
general knowledge is used by Smith & Tsimpli to explain C’s linguistic
behavior. But Smith & Tsimpli think that they can also make room for the
many general cognitive oddities of C, by exploiting one or the other features
of their rich model. So, for example, they must explain why he is good at
verbal tasks and bad at spatial tasks. To do this, they appeal to the fact that
the mind has two separate processors, one for spatial inputs and one for
verbal inputs (to which the language module has access and is accessed by).
They thus propose that C’s deficit is due to his enhanced verbal processor and
his defective spatial processor.
They must also explain why C knows many lexicons, has good conceptual
knowledge, yet is very poor at translating. So they propose that not all verbal
activity is carried out by the language module and the verbal process.
Translation is accomplished by less constrained central processes ; mor-
phology instead lies deeper down in the language module ; and the lexicon is
bifurcated into a ‘ linguistic ’ encapsulated component and a purely
‘conceptual ’, non encapsulated, component at the interface with general
knowledge. So for word-for-word translation the mind only needs to consult
the language module ; for sentence-to-sentence translation, it needs to use
general knowledge about the appropriate use of language in context ; and for
explaining the meaning of a word, it needs to consult the lemma associated
with it at the interface part of the lexicon. Thus Smith & Tsimpli explain C’s
dissociation by appealing to his intact morpholexical component, which
accounts for his good knowledge of word definitions and word-for-word
translations, and to his weak central controls, which explain poor sentence-
to-sentence translation.
They also have to explain why C can answer questions of general
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knowledge very well but is almost incapable of carrying on a conversation.
To do this, they exploit again their proposed bifurcation in the lexicon. They
argue that to answer questions of general knowledge one only has to consult
the information in the conceptual lexicon at the interface between the
language module and central processes proper. In this interface, they assume
that ‘Question-answering [to simple questions] takes place largely on the
basis of a short-cut strategy which bypasses those parts of the system which
are defective’ (171). A well-functioning conceptual lexicon suffices, whereas
good functioning of the central executive is needed for engaging in successive
conversation. C has the former but lacks the latter – hence his pattern of
behavior.
So much for the relation between C’s behavior and Smith & Tsimpli’s
model. The authors argue that their results call for some changes in
Anderson’s theory of intelligence and in Fodor’s modularity thesis. Let us see
why.
For Smith & Tsimpli, the modularity thesis should be modified to make
room for only partially modular information processors, quasi-modules that
are not informationally encapsulated (unlike the real stuff) but are
nevertheless fast, efficient and somewhat constrained in their flows of
information. They especially have in mind TOMM, the Theory of Mind
Module. They argue that it is not a module in Fodor’s (1983) sense because
its vocabulary is ‘derived from conceptual representations rather than from
a domain-specific vocabulary’ (175), and because it exploits ‘central ’
information. They thus argue that TOMM is ‘central ’ and nevertheless
amenable to scientific study, and so conclude that, pace Fodor, some parts
of the central system are open to scientific investigation (e.g. 34).
They may be right that an extension of the modularity framework is
needed, but their arguments for the centrality of TOMM are not convincing.
Their first reason is that TOMM exploits ‘conceptual ’ representations.
However, the distinction between ‘conceptual ’ and ‘perceptual ’ is far from
clear, and it is even less clear how it bears on the modularity issue. If anything
the way to make it clearer is precisely by appeal to modules. What makes the
representation of ‘red’ perceptual is that redness is computed fast, almost
immediately, and so on – in short, the fact that colors are treated by a
module. So it is question begging to say that TOMM is not a module because
it appeals to conceptual information: this may just be another way to say
that TOMM is not a module. Their second reason for the centrality of
TOMM is that they feel that TOMM exploits central information. But this
is just an intuition, however strong, and it may turn out to be false. In order
to find out if and when TOMM exploits ‘central ’ information, many
experiments tracking the microprocess of information exchanges are needed,
and Smith & Tsimpli mention none. There is nothing different in this case
than in any other domain where questions of modularity arise. Consider
lexical retrieval : is it modular or not? It seems so intuitive that a strongly
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biasing context determines the selection of word meanings on line. However,
it’s just by doing very careful experiments that the question can be settled,
and the results can actually show the opposite (e.g. Swinney 1979). Smith &
Tsimpli have no way to rule out the possibility that, just as in the lexical
retrieval example, at a certain level of processing TOMM is closed to central
information and is fully modular in Fodor’s sense. In short, much more
detailed evidence is needed to make a case for central quasi-modules.
As for Anderson, Smith & Tsimpli do show that his overall theory needs
many changes in order to account for C, but here my reservations are of
another kind. Anderson (1992) did two things. He proposed an architecture
for various mental activities, but very little of it is original. He also proposed
that intelligence – Spearman’s factor G – should be identified with the speed
of the basic (central) processing mechanism (BPM). This is the most original
aspect of his theory. It is largely independent from his as well as from other
possible architectures for mental processes. Now, Smith & Tsimpli make no
use of it. They even suggest that the BPM might be only a ‘constraint on the
operation of other parts of the system rather than being a kind of module in
its own right ’ (214), which is an elegant way to say that they don’t need
Anderson’s theory. So, even if they are correct in many of their criticisms of
Anderson, they don’t use his basic proposal and one wonders why they take
his work as a point of reference in the first place.
This concludes my critical presentation of Smith & Tsimpli’s book.
Although I consider it an excellent work, I have advanced various
reservations about the interpretation of some results and the way to interpret
their consequences for cognition. All my doubts have a common origin. They
stem from a perceived discrepancy between the data and the strength of the
theoretical apparatus used to account for them. I actually think there is an
alternative interpretation of C’s case. Suppose you were taken by the
obsession to compulsively and unmethodically learn new languages. Where
would you start from? Just like real second language learners, or like
foreigners embedded in an unknown linguistic community, you would
probably start by collecting lexical items and would attach to them the
grammar of your language, little by little refining your strategy with the help
of some rules of thumb. As a consequence, you would be good at word for
word translation, but terrible at sentence translation. Also, practice would
make you faster at learning new vocabulary, but not at improving other
linguistic abilities, unless you decide to train them as well. Also, you would
guess a morphological rule more easily than a syntactic rule, because that’s
where your general induction strategies can exploit the larger database. So,
in most relevant linguistic respects, you would perform very much like C,
with all the extra wit that your better general intelligence might add. But
nothing specifically linguistic is going on, and nothing specifically revealing
for the architecture of the mind.
Now two questions should be raised. In what way is C different from any
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other obsessive savant, besides the specific nature of his obsession? And what
lessons could C teach us about the architecture of the mind? I think that for
the first question Smith & Tsimpli have offered no compelling evidence that
C is more than a savant obsessed by vocabularies. As for the second question,
notice that we need not bother about what a module is, and what central
intelligence is. In fact, we needn’t even mention theories of intelligence or of
modules, and besides a very general distinction between central system and
periphery we need very little else. You may still like or dislike Fodor’s or
Anderson’s theories as you wish; what C’s case and its analysis by Smith &
Tsimpli will give you is largely independent of your architectural tastes. My
critical comments should not be misunderstood. Alternative ways of
interpreting C are possible only thanks to Smith & Tsimpli’s excellent
analytic work, which allows one to see what may and may not be going on
in this fascinating case.
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Carol L. Tenny, Aspectual roles and the syntax–semantics interface.
Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994. Pp. x­245.
Reviewed by Louisa Sadler, University of Essex
In broad terms, the central hypothesis of this book is that the interface
between syntax and lexical semantics is aspectual in nature (the Aspectual
Interface Hypothesis). In particular, Tenny makes three claims: that the
universal linking principles projecting semantic participants to syntactic
positions or roles are sensitive to the aspectual roles of entities, rather than
to thematic roles, other chunks of lexical conceptual structure (LCS), or
Dowty proto-role entailments ; that aspectual structure is a subpart of event
structure, which also contains the external part which is not relevant for
mapping; and that the separation of aspectual structure from conceptual
structures such as LCS is motivated by a number of linguistic phenomena.
These three issues are approached in separate chapters, though there is a
good deal of overlap.
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Chapter 1 focuses on linking and aspectual roles. Tenny takes the syntactic
side of linking to be a syntactic argument structure which (structurally)
represents a tripartite distinction between external argument, direct internal
argument and indirect internal argument. Clearly, the mapping to the syntax
from this representation will be more or less trivial depending on the model
of syntax assumed. Her hypothesis is that only aspectual properties are
involved in universal generalizations about linking – the aspectual property
of delimitedness or boundedness (distinguishing accomplishments and
achievements from activities and states) is key.
The book proposes three (universal, aspectual) constraints on the
relationship between the syntactic argument structure and the lexical
semantics, and provides definitions of three aspectual roles MEASURE,
PATH and TERMINUS. The central constraint, the measuring out
constraint on direct internal arguments (11), focuses on the role of the
direct internal argument in delimiting the event :
i. The direct internal argument of a simple verb is constrained so that it
undergoes no necessary internal motion or change, unless it is motion or
change which ‘measures out the event ’ over time (where ‘measuring
out’ entails that the direct argument plays a particular role in delimiting
the event).
ii. Direct internal arguments are the only overt arguments which can
‘measure out the event ’.
iii. There can be no more than one measuring-out for any event described.
The notion of measuring out an event, which involves the existence of some
scale of measurement and a temporal bound (delimitedness), is perhaps most
familiar in the notion incremental theme. Measuring out, as defined by
Tenny, involves change along a single gradable parameter. Tenny’s approach
is wholly informal – she provides only a prose definition of the key aspectual
roles of MEASURE, PATH and TERMINUS upon which her work focuses,
noting however that the framework of Krifka (1992) (which deploys the
notion of a homomorphism from objects to events) should in principle be
extendible to support an appropriate formalization. The reader is provided
with an intuitive feel for the key notion of measuring out through the
presentation of a battery of tests concerning co-occurrence with adverbs like
halfway, adverbs of comparison (more) and degree of completeness (quite),
rate adverbials (slowly) and punctual adverbials (in an hour).
There are three types of measure which fall under the Measuring Out
Constraint, the incremental themes (elements the creation, alteration or
destruction of which measure out the event, as in (1)), arguments undergoing
a change of state (2) and the path objects of route verbs (3).
(1) John built the house in three weeks.
(2) The gardener ripened the fruit.
(3) Sue walked the Appalachian Trail.
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Several interesting sections of Chapter 1 look at verb alternations from the
perspective of measuring out. Tenny argues that resultatives and particles
require a measuring-out reading for the direct internal argument hammer the
metal flat, eat the apple (up). Notice that eat is ambiguous between the
delimited and non-delimited readings, but the particle enforces the delimited
reading and places the additional requirement that the entire apple provides
the temporal bound to the event.
Cognate objects, so-called fake reflexives and expletive body parts provide
(optionally measuring) direct internal arguments to normally intransitive
verbs:
(4) John laughed a mirthless laugh.
(5) John shaved himself.
(6) I cried myself to sleep.
(7) I cried my eyes out.
The his way construction also measures out the event, this time by means of
a PATH and TERMINUS (see below):
(8) John insulted his way across the room.
Unspecified object deletion and the conative construction both delete a
measuring argument, with a concomitant aspectual change:
(9) Brian ate a pizza in}*for 5 minutes. : Brian ate *in}for 5 minutes.
(10) cut the bread: cut at the bread
Tenny argues that verb classes should be distinguished on the basis of the
(presence or absence of) aspectual roles and that alternations such as those
illustrated above are essentially processes affecting the aspectual grids of
verbs. Thus result predication instantiates a process of aspectual grid merger,
and constructions with cognate objects, expletive body parts or fake
reflexives involve the optional addition of an element to the aspectual grid
(110–112) :
(11) cognate object VUV NP
event of V–ing
[]U [(MEASURE)]
fake reflexives VUV him}herself Resultative
[]U [(MEASURE)]
expletive body part VUV his}her NP
body part
Resultative
[]U [(MEASURE)]
According to this view advocated in this book, all broad range rules (in the
sense of Pinker 1989) make reference only to aspectual roles, while (language
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specific) narrow range rules which limit the applicability of operations to
certain subclasses of verbs may be stated using non-aspectual vocabularies
(for example, contact is a key notion for the English conative alternation).
The incremental theme and change of state verbs have been widely
discussed in the literature, and it is arguable that the material in this Chapter
adds little to our understanding of these verbs. The discussion and analysis
of the path object verbs, on the other hand, is both more interesting and
innovative (and more open to challenge). These verbs have both delimited
and non-delimited readings, and yet they appear to have no measure:
(12) walk the trail for}in an hour
perform the sonata for}in an hour
climb the ladder for}in an hour
Tenny argues that paths should be seen essentially as measures which are
defective in that they lack inherent endpoints. They do not undergo any
change or motion. Because they measure out, they link as direct internal
arguments. A path has an externally imposed terminus, and the sequence of
aspectual roles PATH, TERMINUS is equivalent to MEASURE. With these
verbs, the terminus can be implicit, or made explicit in a goal PP (walk the
trail to its end), while in some cases the path object itself can be implicit, but
the delimited reading is then imposed if a terminus is made explicit :
(13) John rolled the car to the garage.
John walked (the path) to school.
The terminus constraint on indirect internal argument (68) governs the
mapping to indirect internal argument positions and thus the expression of
the TERMINUS aspectual role :
i. An indirect internal argument can only participate in aspectual structure
by providing a terminus for the event described by the verb. The
terminus causes the event to be delimited.
ii. If the event has a terminus, it also has a path, either implicit or overt.
iii. An event as described by a verb can have only one terminus.
This constraint singles out goals as special, for they are termini, permits the
PATH TERMINUS combinations or bi-partite measuring-outs, and other-
wise permits any number of non-delimiting indirect arguments.
The Terminus and Measuring Out constraints map the aspectual roles
Tenny identifies to internal argument positions and are supplemented by the
non-measuring constraint on external arguments (83) :
An external argument cannot participate in measuring out or delimiting
the event described by a verb. An external argument cannot be a measure,
a path or a terminus.
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In fact, the claim that aspectual roles map only to internal argument
positions is not as strong a restriction on the aspect}syntax interface as it
might at first seem. It does not rule out measure subjects, but rather requires
a syntactic analysis whereby they enter the syntax as internal argument and
undergo some syntactic derivation (e.g. unaccusatives and passives).
The second chapter considers the relationship between event structure and
the notion of aspectual structure which has emerged in Chapter 1. Tenny
locates the aspectual structure (the roles that she has identified in Chapter 1)
as a component (subpart) of event structure, in the representation of some
verbs (statives, for example, do not involve measuring out and thus have no
aspectual structure in the intended sense), associating (perhaps equating, the
discussion is rather unclear on this point) it with the notion of event nucleus
(Moens & Steedman 1988). The other subpart of event structure is the
external part containing the action engaged in by the agent or external
argument. The representation of a path object verb would be [ -- [PATH,
TERMINUS]], and an unergative verb such as run would be [-- [ ]].
The rest of the chapter is given over to justifying the external}internal
structuring of event structure by presenting a number of syntactic phenomena
which are sensitive to the nature of the event nucleus, and thus refer to
aspectual information. These include Russian perfective verb prefixation, the
distribution of accusative vs. partitive case marking in Finnish, English
verb–particle combinations, English resultative predication, English passive
nominals, middles and the notion of affectedness, Japanese numeral
quantifiers (affectedness), and Haitian predicate clefting.
The final chapter turns to the relationship between aspectual structure (as
she conceives of it) and linguistically oriented conceptual structures (such as
LCS). She argues that part of LCS reduces to aspectual structure and should
be factored out into a separate level of representation, because it is this (and
only this) information which is relevant to linking and is amenable to precise
definition. Tenny holds that a number of phenomena discussed in the
literature in relation to conceptual structures should be seen as involving the
interaction of conceptual and aspectual structures. It is difficult to see what
really is at stake here, given that the aspectual structure that she has in mind
may be straightforwardly read off and extracted from those conceptual
structure representations, as she herself observes. Hence an operation may
add a MEASURE, but the kind of measuring will depend on thematic
conditions to be stated over conceptual structures. Likewise, for verbs like
put and place, the property of obligatorily requiring a terminus is dependent
on the degree of manner information in the verb itself – it appears to be
possible to omit the TERMINUS only if a BY manner clause is present in the
LCS.
This is an easy and interesting book to read, and in many ways an
important one. The role of aspectual structure in the organization of the
lexicon and in linking continues to be a topic of wide interest, and Tenny’s
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book provides a clear and simple introduction to these questions. The
discussion of verb alternations in English in the course of the presentation of
the aspectual linking constraints provides a concise, clear and quite
comprehensive overview. The material presupposes no particular theoretical
standpoint, and should be easily accessible to students with a wide range of
backgrounds.
There are however a number of significant omissions in the book.
There is very little discussion of verbs which do not measure out, such as
statives John likes calculus, unergatives Jane shouted, non-delimiting
transitives Leslie pounded the wall and non-delimited readings of transitives
Chris played the sonata for an hour. The Measuring-Out Constraint on Direct
Arguments is carefully formulated with such cases in mind, but the reader
might wish for more discussion of these cases if she is to be convinced by the
correctness of the Aspectual Interface Hypothesis as stated (note that this
also denies the role of properties such as sentience and volitionality in
linking) : ‘The universal principles of mapping between thematic structure
and syntactic argument structure are governed by aspectual properties
relating to measuring-out. Constraints on the aspectual properties associated
with direct internal arguments, indirect internal arguments, and external
arguments in syntactic structure constrains [sic] the kinds of event
participants that can occupy these positions. Only the aspectual part of
thematic structure is visible to the universal linking principles ’ (116).
The aspectual interface depends crucially on the tripartite distinction in
argument structure between external, direct internal and indirect internal
arguments. This leads to the exclusion of a number of important phenomena,
and thus limits the interest of the approach. A case in point is resultative
phrases, many of which fall outside the Terminus Constraint on Indirect
Arguments, since they are APs rather than nominal arguments introduced by
a prepositional predication. More generally, the linking theory is partial in
dealing only with nominal arguments, and saying nothing about the linking
to predicational or propositional arguments (such as, for example, the
XCOMP function of LFG). There is also no treatment of the Double Object
Construction, about which Tenny observes ‘Double object constructions
confound this tripartite distinction by having an extra argument which
appears in some ways like a direct internal argument and in some ways like
an indirect internal argument ’ (81).
In this volume, Tenny sketches out a model of the syntax}lexical semantic
interface, involving Conceptual Structure, Event Structure (containing
Aspectual Structure as a subpart), Argument Structure (external and internal
arguments) and the syntactic structure as levels of representation. This is a
complex model, and the reader should ask whether all these structures are
carefully justified. At a number of points in the book, I did not feel this was
the case, and particularly in Chapter 2 I would have welcomed much more
extensive justification of the external–internal distinction in Event Structure
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assumed. In similar vein, I would have welcomed a section in the book
spelling out in some detail precisely what this theory implies for the nature
and structure of lexical knowledge, what must be specified, what is factored
out in generalizations over the whole or part of the lexicon.
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Akira Watanabe, Case Absorption and WH-Agreement (Studies in Natural
Langauge & Linguistic Theory, Volume 37). Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1996. Pp. xi­271.
Reviewed by Tatsuya Suzuki, Nanzan University
This fine work on Arg-based Case theory in the framework of the Minimalist
Program clarifies similarities between passive and causative constructions
with respect to Case absorption on the one hand, and demonstrates that Case
checking and wh-agreement are closely related to each other on the other,
based on ample data from various languages."
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the theory that is employed throughout the
book, one of the most recent versions of generative grammar, known as the
Minimalist Program (henceforth MP) (cf. Chomsky 1993, 1994). In this
particular model, structural Case is explained in terms of a Spec-head
relation in AgrP. Thus, first of all, readers must become familiar with such
Agr-based Case theory, dispensing with the government-based Case theory
that was employed in government and binding (GB) theory, which is the
immediate predecessor of the current one.
[1] This review is partly supported by Nanzan University 1997 Pache grant I-A for promoting
research.
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It may be said that MP has entered another phase with the introduction
of the Attract F theory of Chomsky (1995, Chapter 4), which eliminates Agr
projections entirely from the theory. But it would be an error to have any
prejudice against the Agr-based Case theory elaborated in this study simply
because of that. This is because, as the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4
especially suggests, are Agr-based Case theory may indeed provide more
principled accounts of various constructions than the Agr-less Case theory.
One of the crucial proposals that the author makes in this study is that Agr
is a Case-absorbing head. It can absorb a Case feature either from DP or
from a Case bearing head. In his system, the Case feature of DP in the Spec
of AgrP is transferred to AGR, when it matches with the Case feature of the
Case bearing head X in (1), which is adjoined to Agr. Then it becomes
invisible together with Agr when the Agr becomes invisible at LF.
AgrP
DP Agr´
Agr XP
Xi Agr ti (Watanabe’s (1.16))
(1)
Based on the assumption that Agr can take or absorb only one Case feature,
Watanabe assumes that the Case feature of a Case bearing head remains
without being transferred to Agr. If nothing eliminates this Case feature, the
derivation crashes by definition because all Case features are required to be
eliminated by the end of derivations. (Chomsky (1995 : chapter 4) makes this
point somewhat clearer by saying that Case features are [®interpretable],
and [®interpretable] features must be eliminated for convergence.) The
mechanism to save the derivation is the process of follow-up checking. He
proposes that an immediately higher functional head will check the
outstanding Case feature of the Case bearing head. This particular version of
Case theory is called the three-layered case checking hypothesis. This is
the heart of the study in the book.
Suppose that there is no follow-up checker of Case. This is instantiated in
the case of passives. Consider the example (2) :
(2) (a) He was scolded.
(b) …[
VP
was [
AgrP
Agr [
VP
…scolded he…]]]
[ACC] [NOM]
When the internal argument is raised to the Spec of participial AgrP on its
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way to the Spec of Agr-sP, the verb is adjoined to the participial Agr, as
in (3).
(3) VP
V AgrP
Agr´hej
[NOM]
(Watanabe’s (1.22a))
was
Agr VP
Vi
[ACC]
Agr ti tj
Notice that there is no follow-up checker for the accusative Case feature in
(3) because of the poverty of the clausal projection of the embedded clause.
But if the accusative Case feature is transferred from V to Agr, as in (4), it
may become invisible when the Agr becomes invisible at LF.
VP
AgrP
Agr´hej
[NOM]
(Watanabe’s (1.22b))
Agr VP
Vi
[ φ ]
Agr
[ACC]
ti tj
V
was
(4)
This is the process of Case absorption in Watanabe’s theory. In this theory,
as he states (14), it can be said that both Case checking and Case absorption
are essentially the same process with respect to Agr in that Case features are
transferred to the appropriate Agr. They then become invisible together with
the Agr when it becomes invisible at LF.
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The mechanism of the Case feature transfer may be supported by the facts
about clitic doubling in northern Italian dialects, Fiorentino and Trentino. In
the author’s view, the subject clitic (indicated as scl in the examples below)
is a realization of the phonetic feature transferred from the DP to Agr-s. The
case of Trentino is interesting, for it does not allow subject clitic doubling
when the subject appears postverbally, as exemplified in (6).
(5) El Mario el parla.
the Mario scl speaks
‘Mario speaks. ’
(b) La Maria la parla.
the Maria scl speaks
‘Maria speaks. ’ (Watanabe’s (1.25))
(6) (a) Ha telephoned qualche putela.
has telephoned some girls
‘Some girls have telephoned.’
(b) *L’ha telefona! qualche putela.
scl-has telephoned some girls (Watanabe’s (1.27))
When the subject is placed postverbally, no DP occupies the Spec of Agr-sP,
thus there is no Case feature transfer. Although the Case of the postverbal
subject DP is supposed to be checked at LF, that process should not affect
PF. Therefore, there is no subject clitic when the subject is placed postverbally
in Trentino.
The three Layered Case Checking Hypothesis necessitates the C! projection
as a follow-up checker. This means that a full clausal structure should be
something like (7) :
(7) [
CP
C [
Agr-sP
Agr-s [
TP
Tns…
The author concludes, in terms of the distribution of PRO, that ECM and
raising constructions have clausal structures that lack a C! projection. Both
ECM and raising constructions do not allow PRO subjects. In MP, PRO is
licensed by Null Case. But neither ECM nor raising constructions can have
Null Case. Note here that if the Tense of those constructions had Null Case,
it could not be checked off because it has no follow-up checker.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the defence of the clausal structure that the author
proposes, namely (7). He presents persuasive data from various languages,
and confirms the validity of the view that C! functions as the follow-up
checker of Case that is carried by Agr as a result of the adjunction of Tense
to Agr.
One of the highlights of the first half of this study is the analysis of passive
and causative constructions in terms of Case absorption. The author
proposes that passive and causative constructions have the following
structures respectively.
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Subj2
(9) Reduced Causative
Agr-o´
Agr-oP
VP
V´
Agr-o
Subj1
Maria CAUS AgrP
Agr´Spec
Agr VP
V´
Giovanni V obj
riparare la macchina
Maria
Maria
ha
has
fatto
made
riparare
repair
‘Maria made Giovanni repair the car.’
la
the
macchina
car
a
to
Giovanni.
Giovanni
(8) Passive
(Watanabe’s (3.4))
was
Agr-s´DP
Agr-sP
Agr-shei TP
Tns Agr-oP
Agr-o VP
V AgrP
Agr VP
he was scolded
DP
ti
V
scolded
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These two constructions share an important property with respect to Case.
This is the process of Case absorption, in which the accusative Case of the
embedded verb is transferred to the Agr that dominates it when the verb is
adjoined to the Agr.
In the case of passive, the accusative Case feature of the participial verb
cannot be checked off because there is no T head that serves as a follow-up
checker for it in this construction. (It is also assumed that be cannot check
off the accusative Case feature of the participial verb.) The Case feature of
the internal argument is checked off at a higher position, namely at the Agr-
sP domain, but the accusative Case feature of the participial verb must find
another way of being checked, because of the lack of the follow-up checker,
in order to be eliminated for convergence. The process will be Case
absorption. The accusative Case feature is transferred to Agr when the
participial verb is adjoined to the Agr that dominates the verb.
Likewise, in the case of the Causative, the accusative Case feature of the
embedded verb can not be checked off unless it utilizes Case absorption by
Agr. The Causative verb cannot function as a follow-up checker because
only functional heads are assumed to be qualified for that purpose. The
accusative Case of the internal argument is checked at the Spec of the
embedded Agr-oP when the embedded verb is raised to the embedded Agr-
o, but the Case feature of the verb itself still remains unchecked because of
the lack of a follow-up checker. As a result, Case absorption by Agr will save
the derivation, just as in the case of the passive.
Chapter 4 presents extensive discussion of A-bar movement. This chapter
deals with interactions between Case checking and A-bar movement. First
the author demonstrates that the Case checking system in his theory correctly
describes a property of wh-agreement like (10). This is the wh-agreement
pattern of Palauan, a Western Austronesian language.
(10) (a) When the local-subject is extracted, the verb retains realis
morphology but loses subject agreement.
(b) When something other than the local-subject is extracted, the
verb takes irrealis morphology, retaining subject agreement.
(Watanabe’s (4.6))
Since C, Agr-s and Tense are all involved in Nominative Case checking in
the Three-Layered Case Checking Hypothesis, it would not be surprising at
all that wh-agreement distinguishes between wh-extraction of subjects and
that of non-subjects.
Next, the author attempts to provide a unified account for what is known
as wh-agreement phenomena, which may otherwise be considered to be
merely a broad term that covers various kinds of separate phenomena that
relate wh-movement and special morphology. His conclusion is surprisingly,
but adequately, simple : Wh-agreement phenomena are reduced to mor-
phological choices that are allowed by Universal Grammar.
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The following is an example of wh-agreement from Hausa:
(11) Mee suka}*sun cee yaaraa sun sayaa?
what 3pl-ir-compl}3pl-r-compl say children 3pl-r-compl buy
‘What did they say the children bought? ’ (Watanabe’s (4.27))
(IR¯ irrealis, R¯ realis, COMPL¯ complementizer)
Verbs take the irrealis form when there is a wh-movement in this language.
Although the above example suggests that only the operator, not
intermediate traces, induces wh-agreement, there is in fact a dialect in which
intermediate traces also require a verb to take the irrealis form.
(12) Mee suka}*sun cee yaaraa suka sayaa?
what 3pl-ir-compl}3pl-r-compl say children 3pl-ir-compl buy
‘What did they say the children bought? ’ (Watanabe’s (4.28))
From the author’s point of view, this suggests that dialects may vary with
respect to the morphological realization of wh-agreement in that the form of
wh-agreement induced by operators and that caused by intermediate traces
may differ. This leads to the idea which the author advocates that wh-
agreement phenomena are reduced to morphological choices that are
allowed by Universal Grammar. In other words, the form of wh-agreement
induced by intermediate traces may happen to be the same as the one that is
found in the case without wh-agreement.
The arbitrary nature of morphological realization of wh-agreement is
highlighted, for example, by analyzing the that-trace effect of English from
the perspective of the theory of wh-agreement. it is well-known that there is
a subject}non-subject asymmetry with respect to wh-extraction in English, as
exemplified in (13).
(13) (a) Who do you think [u}*that [t solved the problem]]?
(b) Which problem do you think [u}that [he solved t]] ?
(Watanabe’s (4.29))
However, a different pattern manifests itself when the wh-movement occurs
in relative clauses, as shown in (14).
(14) (a) the guy [
CP
*u}that [t solved the problem]]
(b) the guy [
CP
u}that [everybody believes [
CP
u}*that [t solved the
problem]]] (Watanabe’s (4.34))
Various kinds of government-based analyses were proposed in GB theory,
namely the accounts based on the Empty Category Principle. From the
perspective of wh-agreement, however, the that-trace effect is merely reduced
to the thesis that morphological realization of wh-agreement distinguishes
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between intermediate traces and heads of wh-chains. This seems to be a
significant contribution to the theory of grammar in that the that-trace effect
finds its natural place in the grammar among other theoretical issues to be
explained in formal syntax.
Throughout the book, the author never bores the reader. His attempt to
analyze all of the French stylistic inversion, Japanese nominative}genitive
conversion, and Chamorro wh-agreement in terms of wh-agreement is quite
challenging and intriguing. This study successfully demonstrates the
significance of Agr-based Case theory and wh-agreement in many languages.
It then raises the non-trivial question of how the insights that were made
available in the Agr-based Case theory can be incorporated into an Agr-less
theory like Chomsky’s (1995), or more fundamentally, whether or not they
simply pose challenges to it. There is no doubt that this book has won a firm
status in the essential literature for the study of Case absorption and wh-
agreement.
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Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics: primes and universals. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996. Pp. xii­500.
Reviewed by William Frawley, University of Delaware
This book is the latest installment in Anna Wierzbicka’s semantic research
program, which involves two overall lines of argument : analysis based on a
limited set of semantic primitives ; demonstration of the role of such analysis
in grammatical description. The book is comprised of revised, previously
published papers, so it reads less as a single sustained argument than a
collection of representative analyses. Consequently, going through the book
from beginning to end is best appreciated by the initiated and dedicated. Still,
a selective reading of the chapters based on need and interest is well worth
it, especially if the need and interest are comparative semantic data, where
Wierzbicka is at her best.
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Part 1, ‘General issues ’, contains seven chapters on the methodological
and metatheoretical aspects of empirical, comparative, conceptual semantic
analysis. The introduction, Chapter 1, presents the case for primes that
capture both semantic universality and relativism: invariants in language-
specific configurations (to paraphrase the subtitle of her previous book,
Wierzbicka 1992). Two important points emerge from the introduction:
primes can be identified systematically (e.g. they are not related deri-
vationally : I is not the same as CYOU, so both are primes), and the
metalanguage for semantic description is simple and straightforward (her
Natural Semantic Metalanguage).
These points are made in the midst of heavy bashing of Chomskyan
linguistics and modularity. At certain points, these attacks strike me as unfair
– in my view, she misstates Chomsky’s position on semantics in the role of
grammar, and she cites Edelman’s dismissal of modularity but none of the
massive evidence for it. At other points, they are unexpected – she ultimately
sides with categorical concepts and against a Lakoff-style semantics. In the
end, I think they are even unnecessary because you can hold her position
without having to be anti-Chomskyan or anti-modular.
The next two chapters respectively inventory the semantic primitives and
describe their rules of combination and expression in the metalanguage. The
original set of fourteen primes (Wierzbicka 1972) now numbers fifty-five, a
large but not unreasonable figure. There are some obvious atoms – SEE,
SAY, BIG, WHERE – and some surprises – LIKE, WORD and PEOPLE.
These go together in sentence-like formulas to capture the semantic essence
of a lexical form.
What this analysis shows is the difference between semantic-conceptual
analysis and cognitive analysis. Cognition overdetermines meaning. For
example, Spelke (1994) claims that initial cognitive knowledge must include
a representation of the boundedness and internal coherence of an object if we
are to explain infants’ early spatial cognition. But for Wierzbicka (unlike
Jackendoff 1990 on this point) semantic structure can be adequately captured
by a primitive like SOMETHING, without finer encoding. Insofar as
semantic primitives are a kind of initial semantic knowledge, they appear to
be overdetermined by initial cognitive knowledge. It would be interesting to
compare Wierzbicka’s list of fifty-five primitives with other partial inventories
of a priori knowledge.
Chapter 4 (‘Prototypes and invariants ’) and Chapter 5 (‘Semantic
primitives and semantic fields ’) cover two standard issues in lexical analysis.
The former chapter is an articulate defense of deterministic category
membership and a convincing counter to the adoption of prototypes in
semantic analysis. The latter is a study of the definition of natural kinds,
cultural kinds, speech act verbs, and emotions.
Chapter 4 deserves to be read by the linguistics community at large since
it takes on one of the fundamental issues dividing schools of thought.
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Wierzbicka shows how fuzzy category effects do not demand intrinsically
fuzzy criteria for category membership. There can be many causes of
gradient behavior, such as the interaction of otherwise deterministic semantic
components. Perhaps even more important, she shows that the appeal to
intrinsically gradient categories often masks a failure to follow through on
analysis. If people cannot agree that a lilac is a kind of tree, then this does
not require that lilac be assigned probabilistic status for ‘ tree ’. As Armstrong,
Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) nicely showed in their classic paper, prototypes
can be processing effects : people claim that 3 is a ‘better ’ prime number than
91 ! Moreover, prototypes are not incompatible with invariant semantic
category membership as long as the proper analysis is done: a definition of
apple that includes reference to ‘red’, ‘green’, and ‘yellow’ can produce the
prototype effects of the classic red apple.
Chapter 6 (‘Semantics and ‘‘primitive thought ’’ ’) holds that there is no
primitive thought by showing how languages in traditional societies embody
universals. Chapter 7 (‘Semantic complexity and the role of ostension in
concept acquisition’) gives the case against ostension in the development of
semantic categories (though I wonder if Wierzbicka is really against
nominalism, not ostension). These papers might very well appear to linguists
to be scoring points in academic debates already settled, probably because
they were originally written for other audiences.
Part 2, ‘Lexical semantics ’, contains five papers on word meaning and
lexicography. Chapters 8 (‘Against ‘‘against definitions ’’ ’) and 9 (‘Semantics
and lexicography’) show that her metalanguage is an accurate and complete
defining language. Wierzbicka makes this compelling point with some severe
criticism of existing dictionaries and further attacks on the Chomskyan
school. As to the former, she shows how judicious use of primitives and
persistent lexical analysis can produce simple, yet complete, definitions of
words often incompletely defined in current dictionaries. Still, the lexi-
cographers would reply that they are not out for comprehensiveness but
accuracy within a defining tradition (thanks to Enid Pearsons for this
observation). As to the latter, she criticizes Fodor for arguing against
definitional approaches to concepts. However, my sense of Fodor’s position
is that he is not talking about dictionaries at all, but the technical
philosophical notion of the semantics of mental predicates, which he does say
cannot be defined componentially. I think both Fodor and Chomsky would
in fact agree with Wierzbicka that dictionaries, presently constituted, are
really just collections of lexical hints and could be improved.
The last three chapters of the section cover color terms (Chapter 10), where
Wierzbicka argues for a conceptual, not perceptual or neurophysiological,
analysis of color semantics ; natural kinds (Chapter 11), where she defends
the dictionary as ‘harder fact ’ than the encyclopedia; and ethnobiological
categories (Chapter 12), where she presents a more realistic view of linguistic
taxa for flora and fauna (e.g. ‘plant ’ is not a category because it has no
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named members). The work on color is especially good. Wierzbicka reviews
in detail the ongoing debate on Berlin and Kay’s original work, essentially
coming down against the received view. With lots of comparative data, she
shows that the conceptual-semantic analysis of color must capture the
ambient meaning of the terms: e.g. green means ‘grass-like’.
In Part 3, ‘The semantics of grammar’, are Chapter 13, ‘Semantic rules in
grammar’, 14, ‘Transitivity and reflexives ’, and 15, ‘The semantics of
evidentials ’. This work pushes an old and controversial point in Wierzbicka’s
work – syntax reflects meaning or, better, even morphosyntactic oddities
have quite regular semantic correlates. These claims have always left me on
the fence. Sometimes, they seem to be a ‘ just so story’. Polish usta ‘mouth’
is morphologically plural because in Polish, the conceptualization is plural
(mouth¯ ‘ two-lip thing’), whereas in English it is singular (386). I find this
hard to accept.
However, at other times, the arguments are strangely compelling, especially
because of the wide range of data and cultural-conceptual analysis. In
Chapter 14, she claims that all grammatical reflexives are manifestations of
semantic sameness : ‘ something happened to the same person’ (422). So even
in odd reflexives (like middles), you can find a conceptualization of semantic
sameness. I thought this hard to swallow when I considered the small number
of languages that use the reflexive in the antipassive (e.g. Australian
languages, Lithuanian and Eskimo). Then I realized that the reflexive-
antipassive often has the effect of stativizing the predication into a property
of the subject (Lithuanian, from Lidz 1996 : 79) :
(1) petr- as svaido-si akmen-imis
Peter nom throw refl stone instr}pl
‘Peter throws stones’.
(i.e., ‘as a rule, stone throwing is a Peter-thing’)
Clearly the predication and Peter are ‘ the same’, in some sense. So once
again, I go from assuming a ‘ just so story’, where either the sameness
argument has to be stipulated for these cases or these forms have to be treated
as non-reflexive reflexives, to being convinced.
So I end on this happy confusion. This is a good and interesting book,
frustrating in parts but equally strong on data. Either way, it is well worth
reading.
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